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ABSTRACT
LIBYAN WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF THE CHANGES IN
WOMEN’S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ROLES DURING AND
AFTER THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION

Haala Hweio, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Rebecca Hannagan, Director

Several uprisings against some long-term dictatorships in the Arab region took place
during the year of 2011. The phenomenon, commonly known as the Arab Spring, started in
December 2010 in Tunisia, a small North African Arabic country that was going through tough
economic times. The domino effect of the Tunisian revolution spread quickly through the region.
Almost all Arab countries witnessed political unrest and protests demanding reforms, but in a
few of them— Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—the situation escalated to the level of popular
revolution.
The Arab Spring phenomenon opened the door for studies on collective behavior and
revisiting social movements literature. However, most of the studies conducted on the Arab
uprising events focus, for the most part, on the collective action of the Arab Spring societies as a
whole. Moreover, the scholarly work on the early stages of the uprisings focused largely on the
military role in the unfolding events and the role played by social media.
In this research study, however, I examine the phenomenon from a different perspective.
I focus on the role of a particular agent in the society by analyzing women’s political and civic
involvement in Libya, one of the Arab Spring countries, during the revolution against the
dictatorship regime of Mu’ammar Gaddafi in 2011. Libyan women played a significant role in

initiating the uprising and throughout the events of the revolution. Furthermore, my research
highlights the ongoing dynamics and challenges Libyan women to maintain the gains they made
through their participation in the revolution. This analysis is placed in the context of the social
movement theory literature, as it provides a much-needed study of women’s political and civic
involvement in contemporary Libya.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is known that the Middle Eastern countries are patriarchal societies in which men have
authority over women in all aspects of life. This type of society gives “primacy to fathers, sons,
and/or men over mothers, daughters, and/or women” (McLean, 1996, p. 366). Therefore, women
in such systems suffer from limitations with regard to their rights and duties and also in terms of
their ability to pose initiatives and contribute to nation building because men normally make the
decisions in all these matters.
If this is the anticipated role of women in Middle Eastern countries when the political
order of the state is secure and stable, what are the possible changes that might occur to this role
if the state stability and the security of the society no longer exist due to sudden, dramatic
changes such as an uprising a revolution against the existing regime?
The uprising against long-established dictatorships in some Arab countries, dubbed the
Arab Spring, was a completely new phenomenon in the region therefore, it will be of value to
study the effects and consequences of these remarkable changes on all aspects of life, one of
which is gender relations. It is important to emphasize the grassroots nature of the uprisings that
took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen in 2010 and 2011. People from all social classes
and of differing intellectual backgrounds participated in those huge events, including women.
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The perception of men’s leadership role in the society was a factor in the uprising of the
Arab countries. Masculinity-based explanations were highlighted when scholars analyzed these
events in the Arab world because, as one explained, “[P]ublic discourse versions of masculinity
studies and everyday etiologies of racialized Middle Eastern maleness operate as some of the
primary public tools for analyzing political change and social conflict in the region” (Amar,
2011, p. 38).
Still, in the changing winds that rocked the region since the beginning of the Arab
revolutions and underneath the masculine frock of the Arab Spring, their robust participation
gave women a position as main actors in the Arab Spring revolutions and in the events after
them. The strong presence of women in the Arab revolutions, ranging from participating in the
peaceful protests to volunteering in the field hospitals or arranging emergency aid projects or
organizing civil society programs to even performing some dangerous traditional “masculine”
roles—such as in the case of Libya when women smuggled weapons and went to the front
lines—shifted the understanding of women’s traditional role in those societies to another
dimension.
Research Questions
This researcher was concerned with the question of how long this new public role of
women will last. Are the changes in political and social roles of women sustainable? Or is it just
the spur of the moment that gave women their new position in those societies? How was the
public role of women developed during the Libyan revolution? And would women’s movements,
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which emerged during and after the revolutions, succeed in securing women’s rights in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring?
These questions will be considered with regard to the Libyan case and within the context
of the Libyan revolution, which took place in February 2011 against the dictatorship regime of
Mu’ammar Gaddafi. In this research study, I examine the development of women’s movements
in Libya from before to after the revolution in light of the radical transformations in the structure
and function of the Libyan civil and political arenas.
Case Selection
I chose the Libyan case for two main reasons; the first is because the Libyan women,
unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian women, did not have experience in active political and civic
participation prior to the revolution. The party system in Egypt and Tunisia, together with the
active civil society organizations in those countries, gave women bigger margins to work within,
whereas Gaddafi’s totalitarian regime, which prohibited the party system and criminalized all
differing ideologies, had not given the Libyans in general any space to express themselves
politically throughout 42 years. Women in particular suffered from social restrictions in addition
to the political ones imposed by the regime. The conservative nature of Libyan society applied
more limitations on women’s participation in the public sphere. Those limitations, along with the
political constraints, made women less likely than men to be actively engaged politically and
socially.
The second reason for choosing the Libyan case is because the Libyan conflict took by
far the most violent path among the Arab uprisings, with its eight-month-long war that ensued
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between the revolutionary fighters and the dissident army units on the one side and Gaddafi’s
militias on the other. The long liberating war added a more masculine nature to the Libyan
revolution because men are normally the sector of society who actually fight and get physically
engaged in war. Yet women’s role in the Libyan revolution was significant from the outset, as
women were the first to protest against Gaddafi in the city of Benghazi (the event that is
recorded as the first spark of the revolution), and later when women took the initiative after the
revolution to build civil society organizations.
Methodology and Data Collection
The lack of available data along with continuing events in Libya five years after the halt
of a long-term regime calls for conducting exploratory research. This study involves in-depth
qualitative interviews conducted with eight Libyan women who were key activists during the
revolution, three of whom held political positions in the transnational government. The
interviews are part of a wider research project mapping the changes in women’s roles in Libya
after the revolution, but here they serve to illustrate the meaning of women’s experience during
the revolution and how that was given voice by key activists and leaders during and just
following the revolution.
The study also draws on other primary and secondary data sources, including archival
materials, official statements, legal documents, governmental regulations, public figures’
speeches, and women’s organizations’ documents provided to the researcher by activists. Media
coverage of the Libyan revolution is also used in this research study with an eye to women’s
participation. Also part of a broader research agenda is to document women’s experiences during
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revolution, as history documented primarily by men has a tendency to erase women and their
experience.
The nature of this study makes using interviews and qualitative analysis to get at the
meaning of the interviewees’ experience the best option for a research method (Harré &
Moghaddam, 2012). Furthermore, for projects like the current one, qualitative interviews are the
perfect method to understand the changing experience of women in Libya during and after the
revolution, as “qualitative interviewing projects are especially good at describing social and
political processes, that is, how and why things change” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).
The researcher used responsive interviewing, a technique based on in-depth semistructured interviews, in order to ask questions, but primarily to listen to the experiences of the
women activists who agreed to be interviewed. In this approach to interviewing, the researcher
chooses interviewees “who are knowledgeable about the research problem, [listens] carefully to
what they tell [her] and [asks] additional questions about their answers” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).
The interviews I conducted offer a certain kind of scientific rigor—not one of objectivity,
representativeness based on large sample sizes, or statistical analysis typical of positivist social
science—but that of meaning (for a concise explanation see footnote 1 in Farnell & Varela,
2008; see also Fairclough, 2015; Harré & Stearns, 1995; and Pease & Wyman, 1986).
The meaning is important, and only by allowing people to talk and share the meaning of
their experience can the researcher provide an opportunity for understanding that meaning. The
purpose of this project is to identify how women in Libya perceive themselves through their
actions, and what their society is to become as a result of their actions, through their own words
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(Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré, 2002; Harré & Moghaddam, 2012). This is extremely important.
No other method can capture this and a survey or quasi-experiment would actually remove the
words that make it possible for the reader to begin to understand what Libyan women believe the
meanings of their actions to have been and their current roles to be about (Harré & Moghaddam,
2012). Through their personal experiences and their own engagement, the women interviewed
for this study provide first-hand accounts about the actual opportunities and challenges women
confront in Libya moving forward for activism in social and political realms. Their words have
implications for the women’s movement in Libya.
All interviews were recorded; they ranged in length from 90 minutes to two and a half
hours, and they were all conducted via Skype or phone. The interviews were all conducted in
Arabic, the interviewees’ native language. The use of their own language allowed the
interviewees a comfortable and unrestrained forum in which to express their opinions and
elaborate on their views with regard to women’s political and social engagement in Libya. The
researcher translated all interviews from Arabic to English. In addition to providing the literal
meaning of the interviewees’ words, during the translation process the researcher strove to
translate the depth of word expressions. In particular, special care was given to key words and
expressions.
As Anderson and Jack (1991) pointed out,
[A]n exploration of the language and the meanings women use to articulate their own
experience leads to an awareness of the conflicting social forces and institutions affecting
women’s consciousness. It also reveals how women act either to restructure or preserve
their psychological orientations, their relationships, and their social contexts. (p. 18)
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Again, looking to women’s own words and how they reflect on their experience of the
revolution, their roles in it, and what the meaning of their actions were, is the most appropriate
way to get at the research questions raised in this dissertation ( Harré, 2002; Harré &
Moghaddam, 2012).
The main tool of recruitment for this study was personal contacts via email or phone; as
noted above, the actual interviews were conducted using Skype and phone. The main criteria in
choosing the female interviewees for this research were for them to be engaged in public
activities (social, political or both), and the diversity of experience among them. The
interviewees’ public engagement included women who had participated in the revolution since
day one, others who held political positions during the transitional period, founders of women’s
organizations, women who are members of civil society organizations, and others who work in
organizations with political objectives. The interviewee list also included women who worked in
the media during the revolution and others with law degrees who were engaged in the process of
drafting Libya’s new constitution. All those women represent varied perspectives on women’s
political and social engagement in Libyan society during and after the revolution.
The researcher would like to note that all interviewees except two resided in Libya until
recently, when five of them had to flee the country after receiving death threats and/or kidnap
attempts against them and/or their family members. However, they all agreed to disclose their
real names for this research study despite the dangerous circumstances that forced them to leave.
They all signed consent forms in which they gave the researcher permission to reveal their names
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and their biographical information, with their full awareness that the data included in this study
may be presented at conferences and/or published in print or digital format.
When the researcher asked one of the interviewees if she hesitated in signing the consent
form to reveal her name considering the threats she had previously received, the interviewee
replied, “You are documenting a crucial time in … Libyan contemporary history … which I and
other women were an important part of …. Therefore, our names deserve to be known. The
reality is that women were there, and they made history” (See the Appendix for a list of the
interviewees and their biographical descriptions).

CHAPTER 2
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB SPRING

Throughout the events of the Arab Spring revolutions against long-lasting dictatorships in
the Arab region, women participated in a strong and consistent manner in various areas of public
engagement. Women in Egypt, for instance, camped in Tahrir Square in Cairo and led the
protests against Mubarak’s regime. During the eighteen days of the Egyptian revolution,
thousands of women camped in Tahrir Square demanding the resignation of Hosni Mubarak,
who had held the position of president for 23 years. Their contribution was exceptional: “in
previous protests women had accounted for, at most, 10 per cent, in Tahrir Square that number
stood at about 40 … to 50 per cent in the days leading up to Mr. Mubarak's resignation” (Biggs,
2011). Their decision to protest Mubarak’s government came with a cost, however, as 26 women
were killed during the Egyptian revolution.
In Yemen, women’s participation in the revolution gave it a huge momentum. Since the
beginning of the uprising in Yemen in February 2011, women did not stop their peaceful protests
and sit-ins in public squares. The recognition of the role of women in the Arab Spring reached its
peak when Tawakkul Karman, the Yemeni human rights activist and journalist, won the Nobel
Peace prize in December 2011. She was awarded the prize, according to the Norwegian Nobel
Committee, for her “non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women's rights to full

10
participation in peace-building work” (nobelprize org., 2011). Karman did not leave her tent in
the heart of Change Square in Sanaa from the beginning of the revolution against the 33-year
presidential incumbent, Ali Adbullah Saleh. She described the contribution of Yemeni women in
the revolution and the impact of the Arab spring phenomenon on the Yemeni traditions as
follows: “I could never imagine this. In Yemen, women are not allowed out of the house after 7
p.m.; now they are sleeping here. This goes beyond the wildest dream I have ever dreamt, I am
so proud of our women” (Antelava, 2011).
To understand the changes in Arab women’s engagement in public life as a result of the
Arab Spring, it is important to know where the place of women was before the Arab Spring and
what the main factors were in giving women that role. In recent years, an increasing scholarly
interest in the social and cultural life of the Middle East has led to a focus on women’s position
in the region. Many studies have been conducted on the subject of women—their power, their
rights, and their influence (Hees, 1997; Keddie, 2007; Ross, 2008; Tallawy, 1997). However, a
large amount of this literature has two major points in common. The first point is it applies a
holistic perspective on women’s positions and draws general conclusions without taking into
account the significant differences in women’s situations among the states of the region. The
second point is that it brings back women’s status in the Arab world to religious factors by
linking it directly to Islam.
One study stands out as a perfect example of this trend in gender literature: Rising Tide:
Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World (Inglehart & Pippa, 2003). Even though
this book does not study women in the Arab states specifically, as it is a quantitative study which
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covers 191 cases, it uses culture as a measuring factor for gender equality. The authors’ findings
conclude that Arab states in general contain the highest levels of gender inequality, and the
reason for this inequality lies in the Islamic culture. This statement omits two important facts.
First, despite the assumption that the Arab region is one of the world’s least successful in terms
of gender equality, there is significant variation among Arab states with regard to women’s
status, to the level that social, economic, and political women rights’ achievements vary from
one Arabic state to another. Second, by attributing this lag in women rights’ realization merely to
the effect of a certain religion, the authors ignore other important cultural aspects such as the
social structure, the historical experiences, and the political environment of each state. For
example, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia all share the same religion and culture, yet the experience of
women in public life is markedly different from one country to another. It may be true that
women’s rights in Arabic countries are not recognized to the same extent as in Western
countries, but it is important to note that those countries vary in their levels of granting and
acknowledging women’s rights, especially political rights. Hees (1997) succinctly addresses
variations among Muslim countries:
Although Muslim countries share a common religion and many cultural traditions, they
differ substantially in levels of economic development, social indicators, income
distribution, patterns of production, and cultural practices that affect women’s status.
Thus, although gender goals such as equal access to education or to income-earning
opportunities may be shared, strategies to reach those goals will differ. For example, in
some Muslim countries, girls and boys are educated in separate schools, in others;
children of both sexes attend school together from primary school through university. In
some Muslim countries women are active in business and industry as professionals, wage
earners, and microentrepreneurs; in others, women do not work outside the home. (p.
148)
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Differences among Arab States with regard to women's position in society are associated
with many factors; all contribute to the construction of the social fabric in each country. Indeed,
many factors contribute to the delay in realizing women's rights in general and women’s political
rights specifically. One particular factor is the matter of underdevelopment. All Arab States are
classified under the grouping of “developing countries,” in which many sectors are still weak.
One such sector is education. Illiteracy rates in the Arab world, especially among females, are as
high as 48% (Noureldeen, 2006), hindering the potential participation of women in public life
and political activity. Another important factor is the weak democratic climate in the Arab world;
most Arab States are dictatorships or are slowly moving towards democracy, and in both cases
respect for human rights in general is a concern and a question. In a dictatorship, all men and
women are deprived of their right to freedom of expression and political participation.
Egypt, for example, witnessed the establishment of the first women’s movement in the
Arab World, which was created by Hoda Sharawy, a well-known feminist who created and
headed the first organized women’s political movement called the Egyptian Feminist Union,
(EFU) in 1923 (Badran, 1991). Sharawy was “the first woman to represent Egypt in international
conferences even before Egypt’s independence. She led the struggle against veiling in the early
1920s, organized the participation of women in the struggle against the British occupation, and
joined the Egyptian revolution of 1919” (Tallawy, 1997). Nowadays, there are three main
streams of feminism in Egypt: secular feminism, Muslim feminism, and Islamist feminism; their
agendas include a wide range of political and sociocultural issues (Karam, 1997).
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Besides Egypt, Tunisia also has a long history of active women’s participation, as it was
the second Arabic country to grant equal political rights to women in 1956 (Noureldeen, 2006)
and the highest Arabic country in women’s representation in the Parliament, which jumped from
11.5% in 2002 to 22.8% in 2005. This percentage places Tunisia 27th in the Women in National
Parliaments rank (Noureldeen, 2006), ahead of countries like the United States, France, and
Britain. Furthermore, in Tunisia, women’s movements’ activities forced the government to adopt
national laws that gave women “greater equality in marriage, and opened the door to major
improvements in female education and employment” (Ross, 2008, p. 119).
By all appearances, women in Libya after the 1951 independence were heading along a
similar path. They gained the right to vote and the right of political representation by getting
women elected to the Parliament in 1964 during the monarchy era. Women in Libya also have a
long history of social organizing. The first women's organization dates back to 1955 in Benghazi
(Omar, 2011). However, women’s rights hit a backlash after Mu’ammar Gaddafi seized power in
1969 and ruled the country for the next 42 years. During Gaddafi’s regime, the country suffered
from failure and backwardness in all aspects of life, especially with regard to political
participation and social engagement: the things that diminish women’s presence in public life.

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Literature Review
The interdisciplinary nature of this research requires drawing from different areas in social
science literature to provide a comprehensive theoretical background for the topic under study. It
is almost impossible to study the effects of rapid social changes in the shifting political and
social conditions of a particular group in society without considering the characteristics of the
revolutionary setting, the cultural dynamics in the society before and after the revolution, and the
specific characteristics of that group.
Therefore, in this section I draw from three major zones of literature. The first is the
literature on revolutions, which is concerned with revolutions as major catalysts of social and
political change. It also highlights the differences between Western revolutions and Third World
revolutions and how the Arab Spring revolutions fit within this broader theoretical picture.
The second set of scholarly works deals specifically with women and revolutions from
three different aspects: (a) the role of women during and after revolutions; (b) the effect of
revolutions on women’s conditions in the short term; and (c) the lasting effects of revolutions on
women’s social and political positions.
The third zone deals with the relationship between culture on one side and political and
social changes on the other. It focuses in particular on the role of political culture in promoting or
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hindering major changes in the society, especially when the society is going through transitional
periods or facing major political and social changes.
Revolution as a Source of Change
Revolution, by nature, is one of the most attractive topics for social scientists. This goes
back to its complexity and the fact that revolutions serve as frameworks for changes in the
political, social, economic, and cultural aspects of any society. As a result of the vast interest in
revolutions, different revolution theories have been presented within the field of social science.
Goldstone (1980) divides the scholarly work on revolutions into generations using a chronicle
order. Based on this classification, the literature on revolutions is divided into four generations;
the first generation is represented by the scholarly work in the first half of the twentieth century,
which was mainly descriptive with a narrow theoretical perspective (Goldstone, 1980).
The second generation includes the work of Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly and
dates from the 1950s to the 1970s, the years which witnessed the rise of the behaviorist
revolution and the introduction of new research paradigms in social science. This generation
provided a broad theoretical base for the study of revolutions by using theories from psychology,
sociology, and political science (Goldstone, 1980).
The third generation of revolution scholars is marked by the work of Theda Skocpol
(1979) and Barrington Moore (1966) and focused mainly on the classical revolutions of France,
Russia, and China. The literature of this generation argued that the main causes of revolutions
include structural weaknesses of regimes, class conflict, and external pressure. Attempting to fill
the gaps in the work of the second generation, the literature of the third generation proposed an
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alternative perspective on how and why revolutions occur; it also offered a new perspective on
questions related to revolutions’ outcomes (Goldstone, 1980).
The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed different types of revolutions
starting with the Iranian and the Nicaraguan revolutions. The fourth generation of scholarly work
on revolutions therefore started when some scholars pointed out the shortcomings of the
structural approach and called for a consideration of factors like ideology and leadership as the
main reasons for revolution in addition to studying revolutions within the framework of social
movements (Goldstone, 2001).
This review is concerned with the major scholarly work from different approaches and
shows the contributions of different research methods in terms of explaining revolutions and
whether or not those methods, or any of them, succeeded in answering the main questions about
revolutions; Why do they occur? When do they start and when do they end? What are the main
causes of revolutions and what determines their outcomes? And why did they happen in some
societies and not in others with similar revolutionary circumstances?
What is a Revolution?
Before presenting the main debates within the discipline that aimed to answer the above
questions, it is important to identify the definition of revolution. This does not take us far from
the ongoing debates on revolutions in general, as there is no agreement among scholars on the
meaning of the concept. However, a basic element seems to exist in all definitions, which is the
element of change; all revolutions bring change to their societies. However, the scope and size of
that change and how it affects the society are the debated areas among scholars.
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Based on the scope of change caused by revolutions, scholars identify different types of
revolutions. Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1995) and Theda Skocpol (Skocpol, 1994) differentiate between
a coup or a political revolution, which happens from the top down and leads to changes in the
political aspect only, and the great revolution (Tilly, 1995) or social revolution (Skocpol, 1994),
which brings fundamental changes to all aspects of society. Skocpol describes the latter kind of
revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of socio-economic and political institutions”
(Skocpol, 1994, p. 69). According to this perspective, only a few events throughout history fit
within the social revolution category; these include the classical revolutions of France, Russia,
and China, the more recent ones of Iran and Nicaragua, and the latest cases of the Arab Spring.
In that sense, those great revolutions act like the earthquake that shakes and affects all aspects of
the societies in which they happen.
For decades the scholarly research on revolutions was limited to studying Western cases.
The classical work on the great Western revolutions (Tilly, 1978; Sewell, 1980; Skocpol, 1979)
remained the source for any effort that aimed to study revolutions. However, radical changes in
other areas of the world, especially in the post-colonial era, challenged the existing literature on
revolutions and made it necessary for scholars to search for different answers to the same
questions. The specific features of the Third World required comparative scholars to adopt a
wider perspective on how and why revolutions occur.
An important distinct feature of Third World revolutions is that peasants are not the only
driving force of the revolutions. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol (1989) argued that in the case
of the Third World revolutions, “the literature that emphasizes the role of peasants in revolutions
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tends to ignore the role of professional revolutionary organizations, groups that tend to be
disproportionately middle class in social composition” (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989, p. 492).
Moreover, Goodwin and Skocpol did not emphasize the role of peasants in Third World
revolutions, arguing that “except for those peasants who happen to live in relatively autonomous
and solitary villages, as did the peasants of France, Russia, and central Mexico, rural cultivators
simply do not have the organizational wherewithal to rebel in the absence of outside leaders”
(Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989, p. 492).
The nature of the Arab Spring revolutions, which were mainly urban-centered, takes them
away from the classical analyses of social revolutions as a result of mass peasant movements
(e.g., the analyses of the great revolutions of France, Russia, and China) (Skocpol, 1979). The
absence of peasants as the main force behind the Arab Spring revolutions means that it was
replaced by other social groups as agents of change.
Even though the scholarly work on the Arab Spring revolutions did actually recognize
this nature in the Arab revolutions, most of the studies conducted on the Arab Spring revolutions
emphasized the role of the military (Anderson, 2011; Barany, 2011; Masoud, 2011) or of
organized Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Berman, 2003; Lust, 2011; Masoud,
2011). There is a dearth of studies that focus on the role of women as a social group in the Arab
revolutions. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap in the literature on the Arab Spring
revolutions by highlighting the role of women as agents of change in the Libyan revolution.
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Women and Revolutions
Observing other cases in which women played a considerable role in huge social and
political changes and the long-term consequences of such contributions is useful for an
understanding of the mechanism of women’s political and civic engagement in Libya. A wide
range of cases reflect women’s challenges and contributions during major political and social
changes in various areas of the world, but these are mostly in the less democratically developed
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Women in those societies face different types of
political and social changes, which sometimes take place through the context of warfare such as
in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, or by changes in the political regime through a military coup
such as the case of Angola, or even through an ideological revolution as in China. However, the
common feature in all these cases is the effect of those rapid changes on political and social life,
class relations and, in some instances, gender relations.
This review has an exclusive focus on the role of women during instant social and
political changes that are caused by social revolution or civil war. Previous cases provide
examples where women made strong contributions during times of political instability such as
revolutions, civil wars, and social uprisings. Yet women were excluded from the political arena
in the aftermath of the political upset and had to continue to fight to be engaged in the political
decision-making process.
One interesting case is the role of Vietnamese women in the liberation movement against
French colonization. The patriarchal family structure in Vietnam is similar to the Libyan family
structure. Women in Vietnam were part of the labor force mainly through working as peasants on
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family lands or as servants (Tetreault, 1994b). The political mobilization of women started in
1930 and was led by the Women’s Union, which was part of the lead liberation entity in the
country: the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. The
party adopted the principle of liberating women as one of its ten goals. Ho Chi Minh fulfilled his
promise when the constitution of 1946 proclaimed equal political and economic rights for
women and granted women’s suffrage (Tetreault, 1994b).
However, women’s participation in public life did not stop at practicing their political
rights through voting and representing the constituencies in the chamber of deputies. During the
years of war against the French (1946-1954) women engaged in activities like mobilization and
information gathering. Furthermore, in the early 1950s, women were on the front lines of the war
serving as members of small groups of commandos when “about 840,000 female guerrillas
operated in the north and some 140,000 in the south” (Tetreault, 1994b, p. 115).
Even though the nature of conflict took a different direction after 1954 on the two sides
of the country, women’s struggle to gain recognition remained the same. In the aftermath of the
war in Vietnam, women and other minority groups were pushed to the back seat by the
leadership, who worked for its own interest, sought more power, and consolidated the patriarchal
social structure (Tetreault, 1994b).
The war of the Vietnamese liberation movement against the French is similar to the
Libyan revolutionary fight against Qaddafi’s regime in more than one aspect. Similarity can be
found in the mobilization of women during the liberation process and the unprecedented level of
women’s engagement in the revolution. However, the outcome of the Vietnamese revolution,
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just like in the Libyan one, brought bad news for women when women were pushed back again
in terms of political and civic engagement, as “the paucity of women in important positions in
government and industry in Vietnam today demonstrates the failure of the regime to consolidate
the cultural as opposed to the class and political gains made by the revolution” (Tetreault, 1994b,
p. 130).
In her book Why Women Protest (Baldez, 2002), Lisa Baldez studies women’s protest
movements in Chile under two different governments: the socialist government of Salvador
Allende and the military government of Augusto Pinochet. She explains why women mobilize as
women and why gender was the baseline for both women’s protest movements studied in her
book despite the differences between the two movements in terms of motivations and ideologies.
Baldez argues that women are mobilized to form women’s movements when three factors are
present: tipping, timing, and framing. She explains tipping as the point when different women’s
organizations are unified to form a women’s movement. Timing and framing are necessary
conditions for the tipping to happen. In order for women’s mobilization to succeed, Baldez puts
forth two conditions: partisan realignment, which is described as “the formation of new
coalitions among political parties” (Baldez, 2002, p. 5) and particular cultural norms about
gender differences that are held by the society.
Baldez presented an argument on why women organize themselves by forming genderbased organizations. She claimed that despite the different ideologies and political stances
women might have, they all share similar grief, the lack of women’s political representation in
the decision-making process. She asserted that “Appeals to gender identity bridge women’s
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different and sometimes contradictory interests: exclusion from political power. No matter what
specific agenda women’s organizations wish to pursue, they cannot pursue it efficiently without
political access” (Baldez, 2002, p. 11).
Although Baldez’s framework provides a valid explanation as to why women mobilize
themselves under the gender umbrella and their mechanism to do so (tipping, timing, framing),
she applied her method exclusively to societies with stable political institutions and active party
systems. She asserted that partisan realignment or “the fundamental changes in the issues that
political parties represent” is an essential condition for women’s mobilization: “Women’s
movements emerge in response to a realignment, understood here as the formation of new
coalitions among political parties” (Baldez, 2002, p. 7).
It is important to point out here that Baldez’s theory does not apply to the case of Libya,
where women formed gender-based women’s organizations in an absolute absence of state
institutions and within a newly formed political party system, which was formed in a country
with no previous experience in party systems by women who had lived under a dictatorship
regime for more than four decades.
A closer example to the Libyan case is that of Lebanon, another Arabic country with
similar social and cultural structure. The brutal Lebanese civil war, which lasted for more than
fifteen years, took thousands of lives, destroyed the infrastructure of the country, and damaged
the country’s industrial sector and its main income source: tourism. The war also displaced more
than seven hundred thousand people. One-quarter of the population was estimated to have
immigrated to other countries (Shehadeh, 1999b).
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In the midst of the war disarray, women stood up as individuals and groups and called for
security, peace, and an end to the war. The Lebanese Council of Women issued a statement in
the beginning of the war in 1975 demanding peace and termination of war and calling for quick
solutions to the crisis. Moreover, the council, along with other women’s organizations, arranged
antiwar demonstrations, conferences, and sit-ins throughout the years of the war. One famous sitin was the one at the American University of Beirut in 1980 when 100 women protested for 23
days, including three days of hunger strikes, against the siege of Beirut by the Israelis and the
shortage of medication and water; the sit-in ended with the lifting of the siege (Shehadeh,
1999b).
The role of women in the Lebanese war took a logistic turn when women provided meals,
medical assistance, and even emotional support to the fighters; in this sense their role was
crucial, because “Active involvement must not be understood solely as bearing arms, even
though women were engaged in combat on all sides in the conflict, but should also include the
great number of women who were engaged in supportive activities, essential for the male
combatants’ efficiency” (Karame', 1999, p. 196).
The war gave Lebanese women an opportunity to move out of their traditional roles and
forced the society to change some stereotypical views regarding the accepted roles of women
economically and socially (Shehadeh, 1999a). However, despite women’s achievements in
various domains, women in Lebanon in the years after the war struggled for a better political
status. Decision-making positions are still dominated by men, and women’s political presence is
almost nonexistent. In the first postwar parliamentary elections held in 1992, out of 128 members
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of Parliament only three were women and all three of them won their seats “for and through
traditional parameters,” as they were all either sisters or widows of prominent male political
figures and “None was known for any political or feminist activism” (Shehadeh, 1999a, p. 327).
Two of the three women were re-elected in 1996 (Shehadeh, 1999a).
According to Alexis de Tocqueville, who studied the French revolution, and Theda
Skocpol (Skocpol, 1979), who studied the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions,
there are vast continuities between pre- and post-revolutionary societies and cultures.
Over time, these can challenge novel social arrangements and keep old notions of
legitimacy and old patterns of social relations alive, even when the identities of the
groups occupying the various positions in the patterns have changed. (Tetreault,
1994b, p. 129)
The previous cases of women’s engagement in the political and social aspects of public life
during critical times show similar outcomes with some variations. The gains women manage to
obtain through their active participation in times of war or political instability might not be
permanent. Women, in most cases, are pushed back to their original position in society when the
unusual political, economic, and social circumstances are over. This research study on Libyan
women provides insights on the role of women in the revolution and the prospects women have
with regard to their future engagement in public life and the limitations of their role in the statebuilding process in light of women’s similar experiences in other nations.
Political Culture and the Changes in Society
The recent political and social waves of change which have marked Libyan society since
2011, and the active engagement of Libyan women in it, provide a reason to study cultural
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changes which have a direct impact on the Libyan society’s perception of social and political
rights in general and gender roles in particular.
Studying social and political roles of women in any society requires considering the
relationship between culture and political participation in general. Political participation in any
society depends mostly upon the political culture and margins of freedom the people have to
express their opinions and views towards the policies of their government. Political culture is the
type of culture that motivates values like freedom of speech, self-respect, and the importance of
an individual’s role in the system and has the main influence on the level of political
participation in general and gender participation in particular.
Political culture can play an essential role in promoting social and political participation
when it gives emphasis to values like self-expression, tolerance, trust, and life satisfaction
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). On the other hand, the political role, played by particular cultural
and social entities which don’t have a traditional political role like tribes or clans (Collins, 2004)
or even religion (Kalyvas, 2000), can hinder the democratic process. The political recruitment of
some cultural aspects to serve the interest of some parties within a particular society is what I
call politicizing culture.
There is no agreed-upon definition for culture in comparative politics literature.
However, the general term refers to a framework that includes people’s beliefs and values and
attitudes. The part of those beliefs and values that is relevant to politics is called political culture.
Almond and Verba (1963) argue that countries differ significantly in their patterns of
political culture. They present three types of political culture in relation to democracy. The first
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type is parochial political culture, in which people have minimum knowledge of the mechanism
of the political system and they are neither aware of their rights nor their duties. The second type
of political culture is the subject political culture; in this type of culture people are informed
about the outputs of the system and their obligation toward the government, but they are still
ignorant regarding the importance of their participation in the political system. The third type of
political culture is the participant political Culture, where individuals are fully aware of their
position in the system and they are active in both aspects of the system, the inputs and the
outputs.
If we apply the previous classification of political culture to locate the cultural traditions
that facilitate democracy and the ones that hinder democracy, it could be said that the third type
of political culture (i.e., participant political culture) is the type in which the values and beliefs
held by people are supporting factors of democracy and active political participation. On the
other hand, the first and second types of political culture (i.e., the parochial and subject political
cultures) are the types of cultures that can hold back the democratic process and do not support
political engagement.
More importantly, in the political systems where the first and second types of culture are
dominant, people’s beliefs and values are easily manipulated, which opens the door to what I call
politicized culture, which means the attempts of some political actors to recruit some aspects of
social culture, which don’t have a political role by nature, and use them for political purposes.
An example of politicizing cultural aspects is the work of Posner (2004), who conducted
a field study to examine the effect of cultural cleavages on the relation of two African tribes in
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two different countries. Posner applied a multi-approach strategy by using cultural, institutional,
and social structure approaches to analyze his cases. He concluded that even though the cultural
cleavages between the Chewas and the Tumbukas are similar in Zambia and Malawi, those
cultural differences only became politically salient in Malawi, where both groups are large in
size, whereas in Zambia they are both small in size relative to the rest of the country. The large
size of the two groups in Malawi gave them importance for political competition. This made the
politicians in the country tend to politicize the social cultural cleavages between the two groups
to gain political power. Posner describes the dynamics of politicizing cultural cleavages:
If the cultural cleavage defines groups that are large enough to constitute viable
coalitions in the competition for political power, then politicians will mobilize
these groups and the cleavage that divides them will become politically salient. If
the cultural cleavage defines groups that are too small to serve as viable bases of
political support, then these groups will go unmobilized and the cleavage that
separates them will remain politically irrelevant. (Posner, 2004, pp. 529-530)
Another example of politicized culture is the usage of religion by religious groups or
parties in the parochial societies to score political gains. Understanding the differences between
politicized culture and political culture can help clarifying the ongoing misconception which
depicts a certain religion like Islam as an obstacle for the democratic process in developing
Islamic societies. In his study on “the Rise of Muslim Democracy,” Vali Nasr (2005) examined
the case of Muslim democracies which arose during the 1990s in some Muslim-majority
countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. He described those parties
as pragmatic who “do not seek to enshrine Islam in politics” but at the same time they use it “to
help them win votes” (Nasr, 2005, pp. 13-14). This kind of Islamic parties, along with the

28
Islamist radical groups that demand the application of sharia in politics, are examples of how
politicians politicize a cultural aspect for political gains.
Overall, and despite the goal from it, politicizing culture in a society dominated by
parochial or subject culture and mobilizing people’s political choices will delay the realization of
democracy in the long run because such mobilization does not contribute to building a genuine
democratic culture that is based on citizenship and political participation. On the contrary,
mobilizing people’s choices through monopolizing their religious sentiments will result in
dragging the society backwards instead of moving it toward democracy.
Cultural traditions can contribute to facilitating and promoting political participation,
especially in developing countries. However, the dominant type of political culture in any
country can play an essential role in creating the atmosphere for certain actors to politicize and
manipulate people’s choices and beliefs to win political gains. Thus, the first and most important
step to promote political participation and support the democratic transition in developing
countries is to improve the individuals’ political culture and transform it from a parochial and
subject culture to a participant one.
At this point, it would be useful to apply the previous analysis of political culture to the
case of Libya in order to understand the level of political participation in the Libyan society and
consequently, women’s political participation. Zahi El-Mogherbi (1989) conducted a study on
the political culture in Libya during the Gaddafi regime. Mogherbi applied Almond and Verba’s
three types of political culture to the case of Libya and concluded that the Libyan political
culture is a subject one, in which citizens are aware of the output of the political system but
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unaware of their role in the system, and as a result, they will not participate in the policy-making
process (found in Obeidi, 2001, p. 16). According to these findings, Libyan people, before the
revolution, were fully aware of their duties but they had a much lower level of awareness with
regard to their rights. The effect of this type of culture can be found in the low level of public
civic engagement and political participation, as products of political culture.
Therefore, it is important to mention that the Libyan society with its categories, including
women, had low-level participation rates by the time of the revolution. However, some social
groups, especially women, showed high levels of political engagement and social activism since
the beginning of the revolution, a behavior that contradicts the previous scholarly findings on
this type of political culture. Therefore, my research explores the sudden changes in Libyan
political culture after the revolution through studying women’s activism and political
engagement. It does that with special attention given to the effect of politicized culture,
especially the religious aspect of it, on the future of women’s participation in public life in Libya.
Theoretical Framework
Understanding the actions of Libyan women during and after the revolution will be
undertaken by applying the predominant frameworks derived from social movements theory to
this case. Using social movements theory to explain the changes in the role of women in Libyan
society would contribute to closing the gap in social movements literature, which has been
limited to the contexts of North America and Europe and suffers from a dearth of studies on the
Middle East and North Africa (Beinin & Vairel, 2013). Studying women’s movements in Libya
will also shed light on possible areas of interest for social movement studies on the region, which
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had a sole focus so far on modern Islamic social movements (Bayat, 1997; Wickham, 2002;
Wiktorowics, 2004).
The literature on social movements provides a way to understand how social movements
emerge and evolve. The predominant approaches are structural (Gould, 1993; McAdam, 1999),
rational (Lichbach, 1995; Olson, 1965), and cultural (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Jasper,
1997).
These three approaches arose as responses to the classical theories of social movements
such as the mass society theory (Komhauser, 1959; Swingewood, 1977), and collective behavior
theory (Blumer, 1951; Smelser, 1962). The classical framework argues that social movements
are neither social nor political phenomena; rather, they are irrational, emotional events that come
as the final stage of psychological tensions resulting from stressful social pressure (McAdam,
1999).
The departure from the psychology-oriented model to the rational, structural, and cultural
oriented visions of social movements enriched the literature. An example of such approaches is
the resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), which is considered the dominant
social movement theory and is based on the idea of social movements as rational social
organizations. However, this theory was criticized by the new wave of social movement
theorists, who brought up missing elements from resource mobilization theory that weaken the
theory’s capability in providing a thorough understanding of social movements’ mechanisms
(Buechler, 1993; Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000; Piven & Cloward, 1991).
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Elements like identity (Buechler, 1995) and culture (Morris & Mueller, 1992), which are
missing from resource mobilization theory, are considered as two main factors in the social
movement mobilization process. Becasue culture and women’s self- realization of their identity
during the revolution are important factors in understanding Libyan women’s movements,
resource mobilization theory provides a limited explanation of women’s activism which is not
enough to explain all aspects of Libyan women’s social and political movements.
Another model in social movement literature, the political process model (McAdam,
1999), sees the movements as purely collective actions that rely on three basic factors that are
essential to understand the origins of any collective action. Those factors are the political
opportunities that make it possible for the group to take action, the framing process which
presents the social context in which the opportunity and the action can take place, and the
mobilizing structure which includes the organizations through which the group can function
(McAdam, 1999). This model serves the purpose of this research study with regard to
understanding women’s choices in seizing and creating political opportunities in Libya. It also
highlights the importance of the social context and cultural norms in the society within which the
social movement is operating. The model also considers the relationship between the movement
and the political structure.
Therefore, the political process model is modified in this dissertation to study the
interaction of women and the revolutionary status in the society. This interaction can be
understood by analyzing the mutual effect of women’s contribution in revolutions, and the
revolution’s success in improving women’s situation in the society. In this regard, the political
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process model should be taken into account when studying this interaction in terms of the
political structure of Libyan society, the relationship between the social structure and the state,
and the rhetorical and symbolic bases of legitimacy which are based on the notion that “women
as well as men have paid the price of victory [and] require that the achievements of women be
integrated with other revolutionary myths, and that women share authority over them” (Tetreault,
1994a, pp. 18-20).
The political process model will be used as the theoretical base in this study to examine
the origins and continuation of women’s political and civic involvement following the revolution
in Libya. Women’s activism will be analyzed within temporal frames that include three time
periods: the pre-revolutionary setting, the revolution period, and the post-revolution context.
Analyzing the political and social structure of pre-revolutionary Libya is essential to this study,
as it examines the environment in which specific gender roles were inherited in and accepted by
the Libyan society. Also, studying the relationship between the society and the previous regime
and its institutions provides necessary knowledge in order to understand the changes the
revolution brought to this relationship. Finally, the examination of the rhetorical and symbolic
legitimacy of women as equal partners in Libya after the revolution will provide a thorough
understanding of how women perceive their role in the society and how this perception aligns
with or contradicts the predominant norms and traditions of Libyan society.

CHAPTER 4
A BRIEF LOOK AT LIBYA’S HISTORY BEFORE GADDAFI
An Historical Review
With its 1200-mile-long Mediterranean coast and its strategic location in the center of
North Africa, Libya, with its three historical regions of Fezzan in the south, Tripolitania in the
west, and Cyrenaica in the east, was a constant target for conquerors and invaders throughout
history. Starting with the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Vandals, and then the Arabs,
who “transmitted the cultural and religious foundation to Libya that survives to the present”
(Mark, 2003, p. 14), the Ottoman Turks took over in 1517 until the beginning of the twentieth
century when Italy invaded and occupied Libya.
The Italian invasion lasted for 34 years (1911-1945) and ended when Italy was defeated
in WWII. The Libyan battle against the Italian occupation was strong under the leadership of the
Sanusi family, who provided not only military leadership for the resistance movement but also a
spiritual one. In 1920 an agreement between the Italians and the Sanusi Family recognized Idris
Sanusi as the Amir of the Libyan Interior. Yet the armed Sanusi resistance against the Italian
occupation continued until 1931 when Omar Al-Mukhtar, the leader of the Libyan resistance
movement, was executed (Mark, 2003).
Women played a big part in the Libyans’ struggle against the Italian fascist army. Some
women participated in the actual fighting; others provided logistic services for the freedom
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fighters. Besides, women also contributed economically by initiating local services to provide for
their children in the absence of the father (Henderson, 1984).
After World War II, and under the auspices of the United Nations, Libya gained its
independence on December 24, 1951. King Idris Al-Sanusi announced the creation of the United
Libyan Kingdom. The name was changed later to the Kingdom of Libya. For the first time in its
modern history Libya was under an inland government, which established the first constitution of
the country. The constitution declared the political system of government to be a federal system
with central authority entitled to King Idris-I. The political system included an executive branch
of Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers, and a bicameral legislative body composed of 103
elected Senate members. The first national elections were held two months after independence,
in February 1952. In 1963, King Idris-I changed the state type from a three-state federal system
to a unitary monarchy that “gathered more power to the throne and diminished the authority of
the states” (Mark, 2003, p. 15). The three states of the federal system (the historical Fezzan,
Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica described earlier) were replaced by 10 governorates. On September
1, 1969 the monarchy was ended when a group of low-ranked army officers seized control of the
government and declared Libya a republic. A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was
created with the membership of twelve of the revolutionary officers.
Political Environment in Libya Before Gaddafi
The historical background of Libya provides an indication of the political environment in
Libya before the 1969 military coup under the leadership of Mu’ammar Gaddafi as well as some
understanding of the factors and elements that have shaped the nature of political engagement in
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Libyan society. The long occupation history along with absence of political stability all
contributed in preventing the Libyans from practicing a healthy political participation within a
healthy political environment. For a long time, the connection between the nation and the
government reflected a colonial relationship. Even after gaining independence in 1951 and
during the short term of the monarchy, changes in the Libyan political culture did not appear to
be obvious.
The reason for the slow changes in political culture is the fact that political culture
requires time and action to be transformed from type to type. In the Libyan case, the challenge
was to transfer the Libyan society, which suffered from being excluded from the political game
for centuries, to become politically active. In this regard, the new monarchy regime faced
multiple challenges, as it had to “create a sense of political loyalty, to develop a sense of national
identity among the three provinces’ citizens, and to build a state out of their multiple and
contradictory interests” (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 43).
One important task was to transfer the Libyan political culture from being a subject
culture to become a participatory one. In order to do so, the monarchy regime needed to provide
not only a wide range of political freedom to the public but it also needed to draw an orientation
program in which people could begin to learn how important their role is to the political process,
considering the fact that
Libya had passed from colonialism to independence at the behest of the Great
Powers, without a unifying ideology or a movement whose goals and aspirations
were shared throughout the country. In neighboring countries, independence was
the end result of a drawn-out ideological or physical struggle that was instrumental
in creating a sense of national identity. In Libya, however, political independence
was sudden and unexpected. (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 44)
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Women in Libyan Society Before Gaddafi
The social structure of Libyan society during the first half of the twentieth century until
the independence in December 1950 was similar to that in most of the Arab world. The
patriarchal nature of the society gave men the lion's share in participating in public life with all
its political, social, economic and cultural aspects (Metz, 2003). This masculine nature led the
community to deal with women often as second-class citizens with regard to rights and duties
and also in terms of the ability to pose initiatives and to contribute in public life. Up until the
early 1960s, conservative attitudes regarding women controlled the society (Metz, 2003).
Multiple factors contributed in this socio-cultural classification. Some of them are socioeconomic and others are culturally related ones. Those factors are summarized in the following
three main points: The profound social traditions, poor economic conditions, and low literacy
rates. A thorough examination of each factor follows.
The profound social traditions linked the honor of the family, particularly that of the men,
to the conduct of the females in the family. Women, based on those traditions, were treated as
vulnerable creatures that required constant care and protection. The society was very strict in
terms of women’s public behavior to the extent that “the slightest implication of un-avenged
impropriety, especially if made public, could irreparably destroy a family’s honor” (Metz, 2003,
p. 112). This constant pressure by society made it more convenient for families to keep their
wives and daughters at home and away from the public eye to avoid any sullied reputation as a
result of bad behavior. It also contributed to the well-accepted tradition at that time which
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allowed families to marry off their daughters at a relatively young age, where they were expected
to work (mainly at their husband’s home) taking care of the family (Metz, 2003).
Through a number of laws and regulations to improve women’s social and legal rights,
the monarchy system attempted to make changes to the traditions of a society that depicts
women as inferior creatures, morally and intellectually (Harris, 1986). Those rights included a
“woman’s right to choose her husband, the right for divorce, the right of political participation
through voting. These regulations also gave women the right to own properties, and the right to
establish forums and associations” (Obeidi, 2013, p. 5). Another law, passed to protect women
from getting married at a young age, stated that no girl should be married against her will
(Harris, 1986).
However, social changes require time to take place and the rights women gained through
those progressive regulations took a long time to be applied on the ground in a broad scale. Only
a small number of women took advantage of those rights at that time, a reality that was reflected
in the limited participation of women in public life as compared to men.
Poor economic conditions limited women’s participation in public life. By the time of its
independence in December 1951, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. The per
capita income per year was $30 in 1951. In 1960, just one year after oil was discovered in Libya
and before the rapid development in the industry, the per capita income per year was $100 (El
Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). During that period of time, more than 70% of the labor force worked in
the agricultural sector (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). Women’s role at that time was mostly
limited to their work in the fields with other family members. It is worth noting that most
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agricultural areas in Cyrenaica were destroyed during WWII (Vandewalle, 2006), which means
that for women in the eastern part of the country even that option of work was limited. In
addition, their lack of skills and qualifications limited other job options for women to the ones
with low skill requirements (Obeidi, 2013). The hard economic conditions in the 1930s and
1940s led women to search for more financial resources by establishing small factories at home
to make clothes, shoes, horse saddles, and crochet products (Alusta, 2006). Women were absent
even from jobs traditionally practiced by women like nursing, administrative positions, and
teaching (Vandewalle, 2006).
During the 1950s, Libya adopted a six-year social and economic development plan
prepared by three United Nations’ technical assistance teams aimed to improve the country’s
economic performance, which was hindered by long-held social beliefs. One of the main
improvement-needed sections in the plan was the status of women and their absence from the
labor force (Vandewalle, 2006).
The low literacy rates of only 10% literacy rate by the time of independence
(Vandewalle, 2006) were a direct result of the poor economic levels in the newly independent
state. Up until the end of the first half of the twentieth century, the education system in Libya
was extremely underdeveloped. During the Ottoman period, the sole paths for learning were
religious institutions, mostly in the mosques; this type of education was called “Kuttab.” In such
educational institutions, which provided mainly Arabic languages and Islamic studies, the
number of students was limited to the youths whose families “recognized the value of education
or had economic conditions that allowed the children to be spared from working” (El Fathaly &
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Palmer, 1980). These factors—the awareness of the importance of education, and sacrificing
extra income—made most families prefer educating their male children over their female ones,
especially as the only future jobs that were available for the graduates were either working as
teachers of Arabic language and Islamic science or as judges of Islamic jurisprudence (El Fathaly
& Palmer, 1980), all domains that are reserved for men.
The Italian colonization allowed the opening of some secular schools in the big cities. In
the academic year of 1939-1940, there were 121 state elementary schools (including 81 schools
for Italian settlers’ children), fourteen of which were for girls (Wright, 2010). However, the
Italian policy prevented Libyan students from proceeding education beyond the elementary level.
This policy shows in the fact that by 1939 there were only two Arab secondary schools in Tripoli
and one in Benghazi. All school subjects were taught in Italian language which appeared to be a
policy to “produce relatively large numbers of Italian-speaking pupils, instilled with ‘respect and
devotion’ for Italy” (Wright, 2010, p. 167). Those who wanted to pursue higher education had to
travel to neighboring countries, mainly Egypt. These obstacles provided extra reasons for
families not to invest in educating women.
Nonetheless, and despite all the discouraging circumstances regarding women’s
education, Libyan history in the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the work of some
women who challenged all those circumstances and managed to prove their capability to learn
and participate in the education process. Women like Hameeda Elenayzi, Khadija Eljahmey,
Salha Eftaieta, and others were pioneers in Libyan history.
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The name of Hameeda Tarakhan, or Hameeda Elenayzi, stands out in Libyan history as
an example of a trailblazer who led the way for women in Libya and contributed to changing the
society’s perception of the role of women in general, and the importance of women’s education
in particular.
Hameeda was born in 1892 in the city of Benghazi. She was sent to Turkey to receive her
education. When she came back to Libya with her teaching degree, she opened the first girls’
school at her home in 1917. She taught the girls reading and writing and also sewing and knitting
to provide them with skills to help them financially (Scout Arena, 2003). She was the first
Libyan female teacher, the first female school principal, and the founder of the first women’s
association in Libya. (Majdey, 2014). Hameeda was also a cofounder of the first nursing school,
female teacher institute, and the girl scout organization in Libya (Majdey, 2014). She also
established the first women’s association in 1954, through which she and her colleagues
provided services to the society like helping women find jobs or teaching them crafts to help
them financially.
Hameeda Tarakhan’s success was achieved with the support she received from her family
first and then from her husband, Abduljaleel Elenayzi. Her husband’s belief in her social duty
was behind his challenge of the profound conservative social norms. He protected Hameeda
socially by committing an act that is not familiar to the Libyan traditions when he added his last
name to hers and made her Hameeda Elenayzi, a name she became known by throughout her life.
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The story of Hameeda Elenayzi summarizes the stories of those pioneer women whose
social conditions helped them contribute to the development of the emerging Libyan society of
the 1950s.
Even though the active participation of pioneer women was limited to the elites whose
families were able to educate them and challenge the conservative norms of the society (Obeidi,
2013), those women took the lead in the process of women’s education in Libya by teaching and
administrating the first Libyan schools for girls in Benghazi, Tripoli, and Derna, an initiative that
was supported by the new literacy law of 1952. According to this law, school education became
mandatory for both sexes (Obeidi, 2013).
Women’s Political and Social Participation Before Gaddafi
The limited representation of women in the social and work sector was reflected in their
poor participation in the newly established political system. Libyan women were granted the
right to vote in 1964 (Noureldeen, 2006). However, their actual political participation was
limited and had an elective nature (Obeidi, 2013).
The civil work of Libyan women started with the establishment of the Women’s
Renaissance Society in Benghazi in 1954 followed by the formation of another women’s
organization in 1957 in Tripoli. Those organizations led the women’s movement in Libya, which
demanded—through petitions and demonstrations—equal political and civil rights for women in
Libya (Bugaighis, 2012).
A careful examination of women’s political participation under the monarchy shows that
the focus of pioneer women at that time was not in getting elected to Parliament or being chosen

42
for a political position. Rather, the main goal for those women was building a strong social base
for women’s participation through spreading awareness of the importance of women’s role in
public life. They encouraged public engagement for women by the establishment of a number of
women’s associations and forums that flourished during the 1950s and 1960s. They also found a
voice for women in the media by establishing magazines and radio shows targeting women.
One advocate for women’s rights and cultural awareness through media channels was
Khadija Al Jahmi. She was born in Benghazi in 1921, and finished her primary-school years in
the Italian school in Benghazi with the support of her father and against all cultural traditions.
She travelled to Egypt to continue her higher education and came back after five years with a
teaching certificate and eagerness to improve women’s conditions in Libya.
Khadija worked at different jobs from a teacher to a seamstress, and in 1956 she was
offered a job on Libyan radio, an offer she hesitated to accept. With the support of Hameeda
Elenayzi and others, Khadija challenged her cousins’s death threats if she went on the air and
took the job, which made her the first female voice on Libyan radio (Alusta, 2006). Her career in
the media lasted for many years, during which she produced and hosted many radio shows
targeting women and concerned with family issues like “Lights on the Society,” “Woman’s
Corner,” “Child’s Corner,” and “People’s Lives,” in addition to being the first female news
presenter (Alusta, 2006).
In 1964, Khadija established the first women’s magazine, which she used to reach out to
women and encourage them to practice their newly gained rights and participate in the
development process of their country. She showed a huge amount of devotion to her cause in that
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she used to take the magazine’s issues in her personal car and distribute them (Alusta, 2006). She
was also the founder of the first youth magazine, Alamal (Hope) in 1975.
Khadija Al Jahmi’s efforts, along with her colleagues of devoted women, contributed
profoundly in awakening women’s realization of their role in the social and political arenas and
their capabilities of making changes in society. But the realization was oppressed before it could
flourish when Gaddafi led a military coup against the monarchy in September 1969 and started a
dictatorship regime that lasted for 42 years.

CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY
This chapter studies women’s political opportunities in three different time frames in
order to examine the changes in the degrees of political participation and the levels of political
opportunities available for women in Libya over time. The chapter starts by analyzing the
political system under Gaddafi’s regime and the level of political participation during his
dictatorship. It highlights women’s presence at every chance of opportunity or signs of political
openness. The second section discusses the new prospects for women’s participation as part of
the rapid political and social changes that accompanied the uprising in February 2011. The last
section is concerned with the opportunities available for women in the revolution’s aftermath and
during the state-building stage.
Women’s Political Opportunities under Gaddafi’s Dictatorship
In order to understand the level of engagement for a particular group in the society under
a tyrant regime, we need to run a thorough analysis of the political relations present in the
system. Women’s political participation under the dictatorship rule of Gaddafi was a segment of
the political system created and directed by Gaddafi.
Under dictatorships, the ceiling for political opportunities is normally low. The
restrictions in political opportunities result from the fact that the tyrant regime has complete
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control over all venues of public life in the society. The limitation in political opportunities could
also result from the fact that the risks that arise from challenging the regime are higher than the
potential benefits; those risks are more concerning in the case of a dictatorship regime like Libya.
This section analyzes the risks associated with political opportunity channels in Libya
under Gaddafi’s dictatorship. It sheds light on the general environment of political freedom and
political opportunities under the Gaddafi regime, including the political opportunities’ choices
that were available for women.
Term Clarification
Due to the special nature of the Libyan political system under Gaddafi’s rule, there is a
need to clarify some terms which will appear in this section. Those terms are:
Mu’ammar Al-Gaddafi: The leader of the military coup in September 1969, which
overthrew the monarchy. He is the creator of the Third Universal Theory, and the author of the
Green Book. In 1979, he resigned from all his official positions. In 1989, he declared himself the
leader of the revolution, and took the role of Head of State without official responsibilities
(Martinez, 2007).
The Third Universal Theory (Alnatharya alaa’lamya Althalitha): The theory presented by
Gaddafi as an alternative to Capitalism and Marxism. It presents Gaddafi’s views of the best
solutions for the political, economic, and social problems of mankind. This theory is described in
Gaddafi’s Green Book.
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The Green Book (Alketab Alakhdar): Divided into three small volumes, the Green Book
claims the answers for the most controversial questions in the universe. In the Green Book,
Gaddafi described his ideas of “statelessness and of people managing their own affairs without
state institutions” (Vandewalle, 1998, p. 93). He also insisted on “direct democracy” through
which citizens will take control of the state (Vandewalle, 1998, p. 93).
Basic Popular Congress (Moutamar Shaa’bie Asassie): This term refers to the Libyan
formal political structure since 1977, which was presented by Gaddafi as the solution for the
problem of Democracy. The first part of the Green Book, published in January 1976, considered
the BPCs to be the way in launching the “state of masses” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 48). In this system,
all citizens are members in the BPC in their area of residency, and every BPC elects from its
members a committee to lead the congress.
The Political and Social Environment under Gaddafi’s Rule
Since the military coup in September 1969, Libya witnessed remarkable changes that
elongated to nearly every aspect of the Libyans’ lives; political participation was an important
aspect of those changes. To understand the mechanisms of political participation in Libya during
Gaddafi’s regime, it is important to focus on the nature of the political system, which can be
roughly divided into three main periods:
1. (1969-1985): This period witnessed the introduction of Gaddafi’s ideology and aimed
to converse the newly established participatory political culture.
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2. (1985-2000): This was the “golden era” for Gaddafi’s regime in which he was able to
establish his dictatorship and secure his regime through coercion and arbitrary procedures.
3. (2000-2011): This was the period when the regime started to open up to the West in an
attempt to normalize relations with the Western powers through initiating domestic political and
economic reforms.
These three periods are distinctive because each one provides “different mobilization and
modernization processes initiated by the revolutionary regime” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 137). This
mobilization process was programmed, according to the regime, in order to “provide different
channels for mass political participation” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 137). This distinction in the political
system had its effect on social life and political opportunities, as explained below.
The First Period: The Diminution of Political Opportunities
Gaddafi spent the first few years of his regime introducing his political ideology to
Libyan society and tightening his control over the country. He sought to erase the validity of the
monarchy era from people’s lives (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016).
The first decade (1969-1979) witnessed a distinctive role of the army as an essential
element of the authority structure. On April 15, 1973, Gaddafi announced the five principles of
the popular revolution, which included the call for the formation of popular committees in each
city, school, university, etc. The five principles stated that:
1) All existing laws are to be repealed and replaced by revolutionary procedures.
2) The country shall be purged of those who are politically unhealthy.
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3) Civil liberties shall be accorded to the proletariat, but not to those who disdain the masses
of common people. Consequently, arms will be distributed to many sectors of the
population.
4) The people who will be agents of bureaucracy destruction will remove all those who
belong to [the] caste of parasitic bureaucrats.
5) A proclaimed Cultural Revolution against all that is reactionary, misleading, and ruinous
to young people’s minds (Obeidi, 2001, p. 48).
Those five points carried a clear message to the mass public that no one was allowed to
disagree with or criticize the political ideology of the new regime. They set up the restrictions
within which people were permitted to express their political opinions. The only opinion
allowed, according to these points, was the one agreeing with the trends of the revolution
leadership; otherwise it would be considered an unhealthy political opinion and would be
eliminated.
At that early time in Gaddafi’s regime, the political culture in Libya, which was
developed during the monarchy era, was still not affected by the new ideology. The new social
and political dogma presented by Gaddafi faced opposition from wide sections of the population,
especially intellectuals and university students. This resistance produced further state
intervention (Simons, 1993).
Examples of the clashes between the regime and the groups who declared their
dissentient opinions from Gaddafi’s new political ideas occurred in different parts of the country.
Some of the heaviest clashes took place in April 1976 when the Libyan army was involved in
Guarian and Misrata in the northwest, and Yefren in the south (Simons, 1993). Another clash
deserving mention happened in Benghazi, the largest city on the eastern side of the country,
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when the regime interfered in the university student elections in 1976. The incident led to
conflicts on the campus of Benghazi University. That particular incident led to a new
phenomenon of public executions, which started with the public killing of three university
students in Benghazi on April 7, 1977 (Makhlouf, 1988). That tragic event, which was the
beginning of a series of public executions that took place in the following years in different parts
of the country, occurred just one month after the announcement of the new political system on
March 2, 1977. This new method to deal with opponents was meant to guarantee the lowest
degree of domestic opposition. Even more, it made people accept the new political system
without expressing their opinions; in other words, it reduced political opportunities to the
minimum.
Within that political atmosphere, Libyans met the new political system (“the authority of
people”) when the formal name of the country changed from the Libyan Arab Republic to
become the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. One of the main declared goals for this
change was to help people obtain more power to express their opinions and views. However, at
about the same time of formally handing out the authority to the masses to govern, Gaddafi
created the “revolutionary committee” movement; this movement was introduced to the people
as an enlightened group of young citizens whose mission was to help people to start ruling
themselves by themselves. In reality, however, the revolutionary committees were
ideologically committed activists keen to serve as cadres of the revolution. This
group began with agitation and educational activities but came to acquire coercive
and security responsibilities: the 1979 General People’s Congress granted the
revolutionary committees a range of powers to supervise the elections in the basic
people’s congresses, to nominate and veto candidates for office in the people’s
committees, and to dispense “revolutionary justice.” (Simons, 1993, p. 196)

50
This revolutionary justice translated into violent activities against everyone who declared
his or her opposition to the principles of revolution. Those activities ranged from terrifying
people by crashing into their homes in the late hours of the night to blatant executions, an action
that became “an annual routine pursued by the revolutionary committees in the streets and on
[university] campuses” (Makhlouf, 1993, p. 6). One of the most shocking incidents occurred
between May and June 1984, when Libyan television broadcast the assassination of Libyan
citizens in several Libyan cities and villages. These violent actions, which took place during the
holy Islamic month of Ramadan, came as a response from the regime to an unsuccessful attempt
to execute Gaddafi earlier that year (Makhlouf, 1993).
Women’s Role in Resistance
The ruthlessness of the regime made it difficult for citizens to express their opinions. The
situation was even harder on women, who would face two challenges: the regime’s brutality and
the society’s restrictions. However, some cases of women publicly opposed to Gaddafi were
recorded during the first and second periods of the regime, when his power and control were at
their highest points.
Female students were engaged in the students’ movement of the 1970s and 1980s. They
were present during the bloody events of 1976. Women’s engagement did not take the form of
armed resistance or violent opposition; it was mainly in the form of verbal mobilization,
providing logistic support to male associates, and printing and distributing flyers against the
regime (Al-Ta'aeb, 2015). However, the way the regime reacted to those actions was not
different than its reaction toward any other opposition.
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A prominent case with the names of the girls involved is still alive in the memory of the
conservative society. A group of female students was active in mobilizing the students on the
campus of Tripoli University in 1976 as a response to the regime’s executions of the university
students in Benghazi. Seventeen female students, fifteen originally from Benghazi and two from
Tripoli, went from classroom to classroom calling for suspension of classes and urging the
students to go out on demonstrations. They were arrested and tortured for a few days before they
were released with travel restrictions and a suspension from the university (Al-Ta'aeb, 2015).
Fatima Al-Ta’aeb was one of them. Her story with the regime did not stop there. Even
after what she went though with her friends, they did not stop searching for venues to express
their resistance. Fatima, along with her younger sister Zakiea and three of her college friends
who shared the previous prison experience with her, tried to contact the opposition abroad and
offered their help: she reported, “They did not reply to our request. We then formed a cell and
sent our names to them” (Al-Ta'aeb, 2015).
After a failed attempt to assassinate Gaddafi in 1984, the cell’s information was found
with the attack squad. All cell members were arrested. Fatima, who was by then married and the
mother of a two-year-old daughter, was transferred from Benghazi to Tripoli with her sister and
Iman Faitoury, another member of the cell, with their heads covered in black plastic bags and
their hands cuffed.
They put us in isolated cells for three days, they would call us late at night for
investigation, they would hit us and call us names and make us sign on papers without
reading them. We would spend the whole day with our heads covered and our hands
cuffed. This torture lasted for three months then we were transferred to [a] women’s
criminal jail in which a new section was built just for us; the political prisoners. (AlTa'aeb, 2015)
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Fatima’s sister was released after two weeks of imprisonment after Fatima took full
responsibility and claimed that her younger sister knew nothing about the cell: “There was an
aged guard who used to bring food to our cell. Every time he entered the room I see tears in his
eyes. One day when he was delivering the food he whispered to me that my sister was released”
(Al-Ta'aeb, 2015).
Fatima and her female friends spent four years in the political prison. There were ten
people in a small room with no visits allowed. Their release came as part of a blanket amnesty in
1988. Their husbands, who never gave up on them, came to Tripoli to take them home to
Benghazi. Fatima’s daughter, who was about six years old by then, did not recognize her (AlTa'aeb, 2015).
Fatima stated that, despite all the pain and agony, she never regretted what she did: “A lot
of people told us why you did this? You are women; this is not your business. We as girls never
thought we would be in danger; our movement was easier than men whose movement was under
the regime’s tight control. That was our duty towards our country” (Al-Ta'aeb, 2015).
If Fatima and her friends came out from their confrontation with the regime stronger,
other women suffered from psychological and social problems. Jameela Fallag was imprisoned
and tortured for distributing political leaflets against the regime; she went on food strikes and
tried to kill herself several times (Fallag, 2013).
The Second Period: More Control, Less Brutality
Women, as a component of Libyan society, did not stop searching for opportunities to
project their voice. The brutal reaction towards opposition in general and female political
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activities in particular which took place in the first period of the Gaddafi regime tuned down in
the second period when the regime started using different strategies to deal with women’s
activism. An example is Shahrazad Kablan, who had an encounter with the Gaddafi
revolutionary committee in her first year of college during one of the obligatory mobilizing
camps for new students. She recalled,
It was 1986, right after the American airstrike on Tripoli and Benghazi. A member of the
revolutionary committee was lecturing us on how bad Reagan was. I stood up in the
lecture hall and told him that the whole thing is a disagreement between two presidents.
He did not like it when I called Gaddafi president; he wanted me to call him the leader of
the revolution. (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
Shahrazad insisted on her opinion and told the lecturer that he would be deceitful if he did not
admit the fact that Gaddafi had all the powers of a president even if he did not call himself so.
Shahrazad stated that the revolutionary committee member asked her about her name and then
He started reviling my family and called it a bourgeoisie family. They dragged me
out and took me to the committee’s office on campus and detained me there for
twelve hours. They finally allowed my brother to take me home at two o’clock in
the morning after my brother told them that I am young and don’t understand
what I am saying. He even pulled my ear in their office and apologized to them
just to get me out of the situation. It was a hard experience to learn that you must
lie and close your mouth in order to be safe. We as girls should not cause troubles
to our families. (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
Under such circumstances it was difficult for ordinary citizens to gain any political
opportunities to challenge the regime, especially under the firm hand of the revolutionary
committees who “developed a broad power base within society and have become tools to destroy
the opposition (the enemies of the revolution) inside or outside society” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 146).
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When the revolutionary committee movement was established, its role was supposed to
be temporary; it was meant to withdraw when the state of masses came into existence (Obeidi,
2001). However, things did not go that way, and as time went by, the movement started to play a
bigger role within the Libyan political system.
A wave of dissatisfaction and alienation emerged among many segments of
society as a consequence of the heavy tactics used by the revolutionary
committees to silence any opposition. In effect, their role undermined any
meaningful popular participation and stifled freedom of expression. Many citizens
felt that they were not able to express themselves. They were frightened that any
criticism might be understood as opposition to the revolution and its leader.
(Obeidi, 2001, p. 146)
As a result of the regime’s repressive policies, the whole country was reformed politically,
socially, economically, and culturally. Metz describes the situation in Libya after two decades of
Gadhafi’s regime.
By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of almost two
decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was an army-dominated state
under the influence of no particular class or group and was relatively free from the
clash of competing interests. Almost all sources of power in traditional life had
been eliminated or coopted…...Libya had discarded most of the traditional
trappings and was using its great wealth to transform the country and its people.
(Metz, 2003, p. 109)
Those restrictions were harder on women, as women were seen as the carriers of their family’s
honor: “if the man got arrested for political reasons, it is ok, he is a hero. But if a woman was
arrested for the same reasons, it is a serious deal” (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March
6, 2016).
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The Third Period: Economic and Political Reforms
Gaddafi conducted hostile actions in the international arena during the 1970s and 1980s
targeting Western countries; those actions included funding terrorist groups like the IRA,
bombing a nightclub in Berlin in 1986, and finally the involvement in the 1988 bombing of a Pan
Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. That latest involvement led to the isolation of Libya
from the international system and to the imposition of economic and political sanctions on the
country. The sanctions were imposed in 1992 and lifted in 2003 (UN News Center, 2003) after
the invasion of Iraq. His fear of facing a fate similar to Saddam Hussein’s made Gaddafi anxious
to repair his relations with the West. He terminated his program of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and opened the country for foreign inspectors (Murphy, 2004).
Normalizing relations with the West required Gaddafi to apply limited reforms to gain
the trust of the world powers. These reforms included the improvement of human rights
conditions and liberties and were led by Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Gaddafi’s second son, who was
seen as his father’s most likely successor (BBC News, 2012). The reforms included changing the
regime’s strategies towards the opposition. Deals were made with long-term opposition groups
like the Muslim Brotherhood movement in order to include them in the political system
(Altaweel, 2015).
Individuals and associations took advantage of the new political openness to lobby for
more human rights reformation. Women were part of the process. Azza Maghur, a lawyer and
human rights activist, worked for years to improve legal rights for women in Libya. She had
multiple encounters with the regime during the last decade of the Gaddafi rule when she took
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advantage of the new political openness. She called for improvement in human rights conditions
in general and women’s rights in particular. Azza takes credit for the progress made towards
passing a law to approve women’s rights to pass Libyan nationality on to their children, a
privilege only men in Libya enjoyed. Libyan men who are married to non-Libyans can
automatically pass their nationality to their children, whereas Libyan women who are married to
non-Libyans are denied that right (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016). She was the
first lawyer in Libya to call for criminalizing sexual harassment in work places and criticized the
legal restrictions on creating effective civil society organizations (Azza Maghur, personal
interview, May 11, 2016).
Azza stated that her activities were constrained by the regime. She recalled one of her
latest clashes with the regime just a few months before the revolution: “In November 2010, I
spoke with the chairman of the Bar Association in Libya about the issue of not having an active
civil society in Libya. I told him that since a normal civil society is not allowed, there is a need to
visualize a different type of it” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016). Azza and a
group of lawyers decided to hold a public seminar to discuss the issue. “We planned for the
seminar in my office. At that day I felt scared; when you live under a dictatorship for a long time
you would feel scared when you cross the line. I felt the danger that evening; I felt we were
crossing the line” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016).
The seminar was held in the Bar Association in November 2010, during which Azza
presented her paper titled “Civil Society in Libya: The Shadow Institutions.” In her paper, Azza
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criticized the conditions of the civil society in Libya and compared it to the civil society the
Libyans created under the Italian colonization.
I concluded with the prediction that the civil society in Libya will evolve virtually
through social media and one day it will come out and change reality. I remember
that the whole room had a burst of outrage; members of the revolutionary
committee movement attacked us verbally and demanded [that I] apologize for
what I had said in my presentation. I went home that night with an alarming
feeling all over me. (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016)
Azza published her paper online and after a few days she received a phone call from the
main office of the revolutionary committee. She was ordered to come to the committee office the
next day. She called a friend and gave her the number of Human Rights Watch. “I told her if
anything happened to me, call them. I went there without even telling my husband. A member of
my staff went with me. I told him if I did not come out in two hours to go tell my husband to take
my daughters and flee the country” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016).
Azza, who acted based on her knowledge of the brutal history of the regime, knew that
she did nothing wrong when she used a peaceful way to oppose the system: “I was doing my job
as a lawyer; I had no anticipation of authority” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11,
2016). Azza found seven men from different security institutions waiting for her in a dark
meeting room. They told her that reports were filed about her anti-popular system activities.
Their words were full of indirect threat. I asked them if any of them read my
article? And I found out that only one did actually read it. I asked that guy if there
was any instigation in my paper and he said that I used a scientific approach and
that he did not see any incitation in it. Then I argued with them, saying that they
lost communication with the youth who started a new type of civil society in the
shadow. I broke my pencil and said, “You don’t want anyone to tell you what’s
right and what’s wrong.” I felt that I managed to convince them. (Azza Maghur,
personal interview, May 11, 2016)

58
When Azza left, she called the Bar chairman, who told her that other participants in the
seminar were also questioned: “A few days later, I met a friend who was close to the leadership
of the revolutionary committee movement. He told me that our seminar was a big issue and
Gaddafi was going for more brutal ways to punish us and even execute our chairman but other
voices in his close circle convinced him to listen to us” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May
11, 2016).
Azza’s experience with the regime in its last years proves the changes in the regime’s
approach towards the opposing voices domestically and abroad. The margins of political
opportunity expanded and Gaddafi started to tolerate the challenging opinions more than before.
However, this new strategy toward opposition was limited and did not last long enough for
people to use it more effectively. Individual cases of lighter encounters with the regime were
recorded but a significant change on a broader level was not accomplished.
Women’s Political Opportunities During the Revolution
A basic assumption in social movements literature explains that political opportunities
become possible when changes in political and social settings take place and lead to the
vulnerability of the established order (Wickham, 2002). Social movements scholars specify five
conditions under which political opportunities can be prolonged (Wickham, 2002, p. 2):
1)

The extension of participation to new actors.

2)

Changes in political alignments.

3)

Emerging divisions among elites.

4)

The appearance of influential allies.

5)

A decline in the state’s capacity or will to repress dissent.
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Based on these conditions, the possibility for political opportunity to expand is subject to
the type of political environment and the degree of political flexibility the government obtains.
Therefore, it goes without saying that increasing political opportunities under dictatorship
regimes is much harder than developing those opportunities within a democratic environment.
Wickham (2002) stated that
In authoritarian settings, in which the risks of participating in an opposition
movement are high and the prospects of effecting change are, at best, uncertain,
even the most aggrieved citizens may retreat into self-preserving silence. Hence
the burden is on movement organizers to create the motivations and venues for
political protest and, in so doing, enable citizens to overcome the powerful
psychological and structural barriers to participation erected by the authoritarian
state. (p. 204)
Thus, the likelihoods to develop new political opportunities become limited under
nondemocratic regimes and more likely to happen as part of, or as a result of, a major political
and social event like an uprising or a revolution. Such huge events would disturb the previous
political and social balance to create the perfect environment for the five conditions mentioned
above to thrive.
The usage of political opportunities and constraints in studying Libyan women’s
participation in the revolution represent the basic idea of creating and seizing the chance. Taking
into consideration the limitations of women’s pre-revolution public participation in Libya, one
would expect that women would lean on the society’s profound vision of women as recipients of
care and citizens with no leadership abilities. Women had to decide whether to be free riders, a
position that comes with no shame in this case, or decide to take initiatives and participate
profoundly in the revolution despite the risk that comes with that participation.
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Holding back and being free riders was expected, welcomed, and even accepted by the
Libyan conservative patriarchal society. However, women decided not to be free riders; the
involvement of women in the Libyan revolution against Gaddafi’s regime was splendid. Iman
Bugaighis describes the beginning of the revolution as a “volcano”; she explains the effect of it
on women and society:
What happened was beyond any logic. The revolution empowered everyone,
especially women. Women participated from day one. The fact that those women
were from well-known families with good reputation and they chose to leave their
comfort zone to join the uprising without any previous planning caused a shock
for the society. The number of women who took that responsibility caused
another shock and made the presentation of women in this event a de facto. (Iman
Bugaighis, personal interview, November, 4, 2015)
Harbingers of the Revolution
Even though the revolution against Gaddafi’s tyranny was an impulsive popular action,
two factors contributed in inflaming the spontaneous event: the other Arab uprisings which took
place in neighboring countries, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, and the increased tension in
Benghazi which started to become part of the city’s daily life until it was surmounted with the
arrest of Fathi Terbil, the lawyer in the infamous case of Abu Salim prison, on February 15,
2011.
The Libyan uprising started a few weeks after the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions
took place. The timing of the Libyan revolution places it third in the series of the popular
uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011 and connects it with the rest of the uprisings. Zahra’
Langhi was in Egypt when the Egyptian revolution broke. She opened a Facebook account on
January 28, the “day of rage” in the Egyptian revolution, and called for a day of rage in Libya. At
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that moment she felt that there was “a real opportunity to have a homeland to go back to” (Zahra’
Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015).
A page on Facebook was created to call for a popular uprising in Libya and February 17,
2011 was to be the date for it. That particular date was chosen to honor the people who were
killed by security forces on the same date back in 2006. On that day an impulsive protest took
place in Benghazi in response to anti-Islam statements made by Roberto Calderoli, the Italian
minister of reforms. The angry protestors attacked the Italian consulate in Benghazi (Cole, 2014).
The protests led to confrontations between the angry protestors and the security forces. The
clashes lasted for three days and resulted in the burning down of more than 30 governmental
buildings; 11 protestors were killed and 35 others were injured (Alriyadh Newspaper, 2006). The
fact that the suggested rage date marks a bloody day in the collective memory of the Libyan
people indicates that the uprising in Libya was not just inspired by the revolutions in other Arab
countries. It was, rather, an opportunity for old grievances to come back to the surface.
The Arrest of Fathi Terbil
As part of the regime’s cautious measures to prevent the planned protests on February 17,
the regime security forces arrested Fathi Terbil, the lawyer of Abu Salim’s case,1 in the evening
of February 15. At that night, the mothers, wives, and daughters of Abu Salim’s victims

1
The Abu Salim case refers to the infamous event of June 29, 1996 in which the regime responded to the
strikes of political prisoners in Abu Salim prison demanding better conditions by killing 1270 political prisoners in
about three hours. The regime hid the crime for years and families of the victims were not informed of the killing of
their beloved ones until 2003, when rumors started to spread about the massacre and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi took
charge of the issue through his human rights organization and tried to resolve the situation before it received
international attention.
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protested in front of the internal security building in Benghazi demanding Terbil’s release
(Obeidi, 2013). “The ladies chanted that night, ‘Wake up, Benghazi, this is the day you’ve been
waiting for’; there and then, the revolution started (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November
13, 2015).
The women’s protest lasted for a few hours, and the lawyer was released in the early
morning of February 16 (AlArabiya, 2011); however, Benghazi did not rest. The next day, a
small number of protestors, mostly lawyers and human rights activists, started a sit-in in front of
the court building in Benghazi, holding signs demanding better human rights and urgent reforms.
Iman Bugaighis, along with her sister Salwa, the lawyer, were among the first handful of people
who protested at the court that day. She recalls what happened:
I told my sister, “If you go out to protest, I will come with you.” She called me
and said, “They are going to the court.” I was preparing to grade exam papers for
my class in the college of dentistry; I put the papers aside and came back to them
six months later! I picked up my daughter from school and dropped her off at my
mother’s place. My sister did the same with her kids; she only went with her
husband and her oldest son. We left home around noon and did not know if we
[would] come back. (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015)
Iman and her sister Salwa were among the first group of people to protest for democracy
and human rights. The group was around 60 to 70 people, 15 of whom were women. “At first,
we demanded reforms and called for democracy, freedom, and equality but when the killing of
the unarmed protestors started, the young people started to arrive at the court and demand the
toppling of the regime” (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015). Iman and the
other court protestors tried to keep the protest’s original demands. They thought that the pressure
would eventually lead to the long-awaited reforms, but they failed in convincing the angry youth
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to continue the call for reforms (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015). The
young protestors led the crowds, carrying the demands for Gaddafi to step down. The regime
forces met the unarmed protestors with live bullets and anti-aircraft missiles. At that time, there
was no turning back: “It was too late, the blood was already shed” (Nadine Nasrat, personal
interview, November 13, 2015).
Iman Bugaighis reflected on the situation: “The regime was very confused and did not
know how to deal with the situation. If Gaddafi sent people to arrest the women in the court, the
whole movement could have ended. There was a list of wanted people and my sister Salwa was
one of them because she was one of the organizers” (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview,
November 4, 2015).
During the first few days of the uprising, the women’s role was established on different
levels. When considering the brutal history of how Gaddafi dealt with opposition, it is worth
noting that women came out of their comfort zone during the most threatening and dangerous
days of his rule. Hana El-Gallal left her home on February 17, 2011 without telling her family.
She took her two children to her sister’s and told her to take care of them because she was going
on a one-way-ticket journey. No one believed that Gaddafi could be overthrown; it was a
crazy moment. I arrived [at] the court and everyone was cheering. I felt so safe. It was an
amazing feeling. The feeling of suspicion and hate was not there anymore; we were one.
It was a feeling I never experienced before; it was like a dream. (Hana El-Gallal, personal
interview, November 15, 2015)
Women’s Role in the Uprising
The decision made by Libyan women to participate in the revolution was reflected in the
level of participation and the number of turnouts in the protests and social programs to help the
wounded and search for the missing people during the war. Women were the backbone of the
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revolutionary movement by providing logistic services to the front line from nursing to cooking
thousands of meals a day for the revolutionists at the battlefront (Bugaighis, 2012).
Women’s participation in the revolution was not limited to the women in Benghazi and
the eastern part of the country. The western side of Libya, especially the capital city, Tripoli,
suffered from a siege that lasted for six months. During this time, the people had to respond to
the regime’s brutality by using different forms of resistance. Even there, women were involved
in the revolution as they “hid fighters and cooked them meals. They sewed flags, collected
money, contacted journalists. They ran guns and, in a few cases, used them” (Barnard, 2011).
Moreover, women smuggled weapons to the revolutionists, tended wounded rebels, and some of
them worked as guides for NATO to find airstrike targets in Tripoli (Barnard, 2011). Examples
of the courageous acts of Libyan women in the besieged cities during the revolution included the
following:
Aisha Gdour, a school psychologist, smuggled bullets in her brown leather
handbag. Fatima Bredan, a hairdresser, tended wounded rebels. Hweida
Shibadi, a family lawyer, helped NATO find airstrike targets. And Amal
Bashir, an art teacher, used a secret code to collect orders for munitions: Smallcaliber rounds were called “pins”; larger rounds were “nails.” A “bottle of
milk” meant a Kalashnikov. (Barnard, 2011)
Hana El-Hebshi was a recipient of the International Women of Courage Award in 2012
(U.S. Department of State, 2012) for her intelligence role during the revolution, as she advised
NATO of the military locations to strike. She also worked with her family in manufacturing
hand-made bombs and delivered them to the revolutionaries. International media knew Hana by
her pseudonym “Numidia.” She provided regular reports on the situation in Tripoli and human
rights violations under the siege of Gaddafi. She recalls her strategy: “I was using different
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phone numbers—up to 18 and with two different phone companies. I would only call while in a
moving car, I never call[ed] from home and my brother was always with me” (El-Hebshi, 2012).
Seizing the Opportunity
Political opportunities in the time of crisis are not given; they are detained and earned by
the challenging group. Various factors can play a role in deciding the size and limits of political
opportunity. In the case of the Libyan revolution, women earned their opportunity from day one
when the mothers of Abu Salim’s victims protested in front of the security building commanding
the release of their attorney. At that time, those women were the only section in the Libyan
society that had experience in protesting. The permit given to those families to protest was meant
to absorb the popular outrage that was fueled by the crime committed by the government of
killing more than 1200 prisoners in Abu Salim prison in three hours. Years of silent protests in
Benghazi made those women the perfect starters of the uprising. Fathi Terbil, the attorney for the
victims’ families, explained the circumstances under which those women played a major role in
initiating the uprising.
In the last four years of Gaddafi’s regime, the mothers, sisters, and wives of the
Abu Salim Massacre used to protest every Saturday to demand justice for their
beloved ones. They took advantage of the regime’s signs of openness, which were
the result of national and international pressure. Therefore, women played a huge
role in preparing for the revolution and participating in it. The bravery of those
wives, daughters, mothers, and sisters was unimaginable. They created the
rebellion culture through their weekly protests. (Obeidi, 2013, p. 9)
When the uprising started, the situation required the revolutionaries to put in the
foreground the people with expertise and capabilities who were able to manage the situation.
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Women rose as the perfect choice. Iman Bugaighis described the situation during the first few
days in the court:
Most of the people inside the courthouse did not have leadership qualities; they
did not have the skills or the vision to deal with the situation. Most of them were
lawyers who did not speak other languages. I was chosen to be the spokesperson
of the Transitional Council because I was prepared for the position. I was
professional and tried to provide as accurate information as I could. I worked with
efficiency and professionalism; that made foreign press and international human
rights organizations ask to work with me by name. It was a foregone conclusion I
would be the perfect person for the job. (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview,
November 4, 2015)
However, even though Iman believes that she was the best choice to be the first
spokesperson in the revolution, she admits that being a woman in that position in itself was a
message sent to the international community: “Women’s presence in the picture was very crucial
in the beginning of the revolution. My sister and I did not wear hijab (head scarf); our role was to
change the stereotype of Libyan women and to reassure the West that our revolution is not an
Islamist one” (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015).
Women’s choice to take the newly opened opportunity to the maximum limit did not
come without a risk. Najla Elmangoush was willing to take that risk when she agreed to go on
the third day of the revolution to a radio station located in Abu-Dezzerah, a small town located in
the Benghazi suburbs. She went with two other female activists, Salwa El-Deghali and Hana ElGallal. The three women were accompanied by a group of young revolutionary men whom Najla
had never met before. They had no weapons, yet she trusted them for protection. They drove
about an hour to check whether they could use the radio station to broadcast the revolution’s
updates and to encourage the people of Benghazi and the surrounding cities. The building was
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partly destroyed, and the young men spent a long time trying to fix the wires and get the station
working again. Najla describes that moment:
When we started the broadcasting, we all sat [in] a circle and handed the
microphone to each other to say one thing: “Libya is free.” It was a wonderful
feeling and a touching moment I will cherish forever; we were all crying…. I did
not think at that time of the risky situation we were in. I did not want to think that
our broadcasting was live and Gaddafi’s air forces could have easily located our
position and strike us. I was like a child exploring a new toy. When I recall that
day, I always ask myself, “What was I thinking when I did that?” (Najla
Elmangoush, personal interview, December 5, 2015)
Najla read the first declaration of the uprising and requested people to remain calm and to
submit any arms in their possession to the collection points in the city. She and her companions
stayed in the radio station until a late hour that night (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview,
December 5, 2015).
Creating Opportunities
Participating in the revolution was not limited to certain geographic locations. Libyan
women in exile did not allow the distance to stop them from doing their share. They created their
own opportunities to participate in the revolution. Shahrazad Kablan, who had lived in exile in
the United States for more than sixteen years by the time of the revolution, decided it was time
for her to do something for her country. She left her home in Ohio and took an unpaid leave from
her work to camp in front of the White House. She felt that it was her duty to get the Libyan
people’s message across to the decision makers in Washington, D.C. She risked her family’s
safety and her chances of re-entering Libya, had the revolution been suppressed, when she
agreed to appear on Al-Jazeera news channel with her full name to talk about the uprising in
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Libya (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016). Shahrazad also created a network
to deliver the revolutionary message to decision makers in the U.S. She met teams from the
National Security Council and the United Nations and talked to them about the demands of the
revolutionaries and the brutality of the regime. She also played a role in convincing the Libyan
ambassador to declare his dissension with the regime (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview,
March 6, 2016). However, her biggest contribution was when she became the first female face to
appear on TV on the revolutionary channel “Libya al-Ahrar” to present a daily show that lasted
until the liberation of Tripoli in August 2011 and earned huge popularity among Libyans.
Another example is Zahra’ Langhi, daughter of a prominent opposition member, who left
the country when she was three years old and had lived her whole life in exile. However, when
the revolution started she felt responsible to do her share in the big event. She started contacting
international media to provide an update on what was going on in Libya. When she was asked
who she was, she gave herself a title as the Libyan opposition coordinator in Egypt (Zahra’
Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015).
Zahra’ was emotionally affected by the Egyptian revolution and decided it was time for
Libya to revolt against Gaddafi’s dictatorship. She contacted Libyan and Egyptian journalists
and intellectuals and created a movement called Egyptian Friends for a Free Libya through
which she tried to show
the real cultural and civilizational face of Libya to counter the image of Libyans
in the West as illiterates and uncivilized. I knew the West was apprehensive of the
situation in Libya. Our goal was to show the civilized dimension of our revolution
and highlight the fact that Gaddafi’s intransigence was the reason our revolution
changed from being a peaceful uprising to become an armed revolution. (Zahra’
Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015)
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Zahra’s contribution did not stop there. She started a hotline with her cousins in Libya to
follow up with the developments on the ground and worked as an outreach station connecting the
international media with people inside. She also organized different courses for Libyan youth to
be trained in Egypt in areas like civic journalism and documentation of human rights, in which
she insisted on including female participants. Those girls who were eager to learn by taking the
risk of traveling by car from Libya to Egypt “formed the basis of youth journalism in Libya
which took off in the period after the revolution and many of them [are] still working as
correspondents for news television channels and newspapers (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview,
December 14, 2015).
Rationalizing Women’s Actions
When looking at women’s actions in the beginning of the revolution and how they chose
to rise for the occasion, a question must be asked: Why didn’t women choose to be free riders?
Why did they choose to risk their lives and reputations by being in the heart of the event?
Women made their decision to be part of the event at all levels—individually by taking specific
responsibilities at the leadership level and collectively by protesting in the streets and conducting
sit-ins in the squares of Benghazi and other eastern Libyan cities since day one of the revolution.
They also decided to be in the heart of the event by tending the wounded rebels and smuggling
weapons in Tripoli and other western cities when it was under siege by Gaddafi’s soldiers. That
decision was taken under critical circumstances considering the fact that Gaddafi’s regime was
still in its full powers.
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Therefore, women participated in the revolution because they sought an ultimate goal of
freedom and equality, which exceeded their narrow interests of safety and risk-free choices. As
Najla Elmangoush, a divorced mother of two girls, explicitly stated, “I did not join the revolution
to pursue a personal dream, I did so because I always believed that we deserved a better life. Part
of me wanted to rebel [against] the social and political restrictions we suffered from. That’s why
I was working for more than twelve hours a day during the revolution without feeling tired; the
revolution was our hope” (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview, December 5, 2015).
Iman Bugaighis provided a different motivation for participating in the revolution when
she claimed it was her duty to participate since she was a role model for her students: “I had to
be in the first line; I felt I would betray my students if I [didn’t] participate” (Iman Bugaighis,
personal interview, November 4, 2015).
Hana El-Gallal, the international law professor who joined the revolution on February 17,
2011 and was present during the first official meeting of the Transnational Council, offered
another illustration of women’s motivations for joining the revolution:
There are hidden memories we all have; those memories affect our decisions in
life. I was a child during the 1980s and I lived through Gaddafi’s public
executions of university students. I always wondered why the older people at that
time did not support the youth and stop Gaddafi from doing what he did to them. I
always thought things could’ve been different had they stood up to his actions.
When the uprising started in 2011, I was … the same age my parents were in the
1980s; I felt responsible not to let the youth down. I did not want to repeat the
mistake the generation before us did back in the 1980s. Therefore, when the youth
went out on the streets, I went with them. (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview,
November 15, 2015)
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Women’s Political Opportunities in Libya After the Revolution
The rapid political and social changes that accompanied the occurrence of the revolution
were temporally attached to the status of revolution in the first few months of the uprising
against the Gaddafi regime. A new status was created as soon as Gaddafi was captured and killed
and the chair of the National Transitional Council delivered the liberation speech on October 24,
2011. That date marked the start of the state-building process that requires a separate analysis of
the political opportunities accessible for women during this transition era.
Women started the state-building phase willing to maintain their newly gained political
and social status and sustain it through the transitional period. However, despite the efforts to
secure a place for women in the decision-making process, concerns were raised about securing
sustainable public activities and a continued political participation for women after the
revolution. Women’s presence in the public sphere witnessed a backlash two years following the
revolution. Women, who scored new records of participation and creating new opportunities in
the first two years after the revolution, started to lose their position as a complete partner in the
state-building process. The interviewees for this research indicated three main factors as the
reasons for the decrease in women’s political opportunities:
1.
2.
3.

The assassination of Salwa Bugaighis, the lawyer and Vice Chair of the National
Dialogue Preparatory Commission on June 25, 2014.
The rise of Islamist groups.
Lack of security and the proliferation of arms.

Those new factors show that obstacles to women’s political participation go beyond the
traditional perception of women; the lack of security and the absence of the rule of law along
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with the extreme levels of violence among the unchecked militias, the rise of extremist Islamist
groups, and the increased number of war crimes are all indicators of the challenges women
encounter in new Libya.
Hana El-Gallal stressed the role played by the Islamist groups in reducing women’s
chances of keeping their political gains: “Islamist stream gained a sudden strength in the Arab
Spring countries. Its extreme thought does not accept women’s presence in the public sphere; it
does not allow women to work or travel without a male chaperone. All these restrictions led to
the reduction of women’s public role” (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015).
The call for a limited role for women in politics came from different sides, from Islamist
political groups and armed militias to some General National Congress (GNC) male members.
Examples of violations against female politicians ranged from verbal abuse to assassination.
Mohamed Kilani, an Islamist member in the GNC, demanded the female members of the GNC to
be seated in a different room from men because “GNC members are distracted by their
colleagues who wore make up, dressed indecently and mingled with men” (Libyan Women's
Platform for Peace [LWPP], 2014). Another incident happened when a member in the GNC
physically attacked a female GNC member because she disagreed with him. The same individual
is now the head of Dawn of Libya Operation, the biggest militia group in Tripoli (LWPP, 2014).
The lack of security and the absence of the rule of law had a negative effect on women’s
participation in the public arena. Women became
targeted segments in the streets and in their homes. During the revolution we
knew where the threat is coming from. Now I receive threats and I cannot tell who
is behind them. I received daily threats in the form of message on the phone or a
letter on my car [wind]shield. They threatened me that that if I don’t stop my
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work they will enter my home and kill my kids. I had to flee the country with my
family. (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015)
Female members of the Council of Representatives received their share of threats and
attacks as well. Houses of some female representatives and candidates were robbed and burned
down. Other female representatives received threats to burn down their houses (LWPP, 2014).
However, the attacks against women reached an unprecedented level with the murder of
Salwa Bugaighis, a lawyer and human rights activist and Vice Chair of the National Dialogue
Preparatory Commission (LWPP, 2014). Salwa, who was one of the first Libyans to participate
in the uprising against Gaddafi, had to flee the country, just like other activists, after receiving
death threats. She came back to Benghazi to vote in the parliamentary elections held in June
2014. She posted her photos in the voting center on social media and spent the day encouraging
the people of Benghazi to go out and vote to secure a better future for Libya (LWPP, 2014). That
same day, according to the story of her gardener, several hooded men entered her home and
brutally killed her and kidnapped her husband (The Guardian, 2014). An investigation was
claimed to be opened on the incident but no charges been filed since.
Salwa’s murder was a “decisive event” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11,
2016) and a turning point for women’s activism in Libya, as most female activists had to flee the
country after receiving death threats, the thing that made “the whole women’s movement [revert]
to an idle status. After Salwa’s assassination, women came under huge familial and societal
pressure to stop or reduce their activities for their own safety” (Nadine Nasrat, personal
interview, November 13, 2015).
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After the assassination of Salwa Bugaighis, more women were murdered in different
Libyan cities. Fariha Al-Berkawi, a former GNC member, was killed in Derna, her home city,
and Salwa Henied, a member of the national security under the Gaddafi regime, was also killed
by uncharted killers.
The difficult times through which the country is going call for cautious measures to be
taken by women’s organizations and individuals alike. However, Libyan women, who refused to
be free riders during the revolution, did not stop their efforts to secure a sustainable and
meaningful place for women in the Libyan political and civic arenas. Even though most female
activists fled the country after the increased violence against women and after receiving threats
(LWPP, 2014), women’s rights organizations did not stop their work in supporting women’s
rights through organizing regular meetings and workshops held abroad in countries like Egypt
and Tunisia. Moreover, despite freezing their activities on the ground, a large number of activists
used their time outside of Libya to improve their skills in building capacity camps
and training sessions in different countries. I believe that this forced exile of
women has a positive side [in] the long run, as those women will return to Libya
stronger and more capable of contributing in the state-building process. (Hana ElGallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015)
Conclusion
Political opportunities depend, for the most part, on the type of regime and the window of
political participation it allows for its citizens. Libyan women, however, did not only seize the
provided opportunities, they created their own. Even when political participation was at its
lowest levels during Gaddafi’s rule, individual cases tell the story of women who tried to make
their voice heard under the most oppressive circumstances.
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Those stories, however, remained limited to a small number of women who seized or
created their prospects until the revolution in 2011. Women then acted collectively; they were
present in every aspect of the revolutionary act. Their participation is not connected to
individuals, though some individuals took the initiative; it is the uprising of a whole segment of
the society. Women in the revolution were aware of their role, their duty, and their potential.
Therefore, their strong presence during the revolution and the opportunities they obtained were
targeted and attacked. Attempts to exclude women from the political scene and the state-building
process show a backlash in the progress made to secure a sustainable presentation of women in
the political arena.

CHAPTER 6
THE FRAMING PROCESS
The framing process factor represents the collective effect of social compositions
including culture, norms, social structure, and challenges that work as mediation factors that
contribute to, or sometimes limit, the process of social movement from opportunity to action.
It is important to emphasize that the main challenge to women’s social movements in
Libya is not limited to a government that may refuse to allow women more political rights, or
political institutions which can deny women’s rights in equality. The biggest challenge is, rather,
the predominant culture. That culture has always depicted women as second-class citizens with
regard to political and social rights. As a result, the participation of women in public life before
the revolution almost did not exist.
The Framing Process under Gaddafi’s Regime
Libya is a patriarchal society that considers men’s presence in public life a natural right,
while placing societal and ethical restrictions on the participation of women in certain areas in
public life, especially in areas where women would stand out individually and are being
recognized by their name and description, such as working in the fields of politics and media. In
addition, as part of a society that lived under the rule of a dictator, women were under extra
pressure to hide away from the society’s public stage, as the coercive nature of Gaddafi’s regime
made it much safer for people to be inconspicuous in terms of being active in public life. The
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combination of restrictive social norms and a brutal dictatorship regime created an atmosphere in
which “women had no guarantees for their safety. There were no institutions or laws or even a
state as we all know it, only a confusing popular system” (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview,
November 15, 2015).
The women who entered the public sphere at that time would become “subject of ethical
suspicions by the society” (Hana El-Gallal, Personal interview, November 15, 2015). It was a
profound belief in the society that each person, man or woman, who would agree to be part of the
political system, must “give compromises to Gaddafi of all sorts; that’s why the government was
not a decent place to work in, especially for women, who were used physically and sexually”
(Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015). The interviewees for this research
agreed on two types of women that were active in the public sphere during Gaddafi’s regime:
1.
2.

Gaddafi’s female guards (The Amazonians).
The female loyal members in the revolutionary committees who held political positions
(the revolutionary nuns).

The Amazonians: A Blatant Challenge to the Values of Society
Gaddafi’s female guards, known as The Amazonians, started to be a regular segment in
Gaddafi’s public appearances as responsible for his personal security since the 1970s and were
always around 30 women (Flock, 2011). Gaddafi’s insistence on surrounding himself with
female guards was to promote his image as a women’s rights advocate, or, as he liked to refer to
himself, “the women’s liberator.” He promoted gender equality in his Green Book and called for
the liberation of women from the constraints of society. Gaddafi challenged the conservative
norms of Libyan society through a series of radical measures regarding women, one of which
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was in 1979 when “women were required to undertake military training” (Bugaughis, 2012, p.
3). In 1981, the first class graduated from the women’s military academy in Tripoli (Henderson,
1984).
Recruiting women to work in new fields like the military was part of Gaddafi’s policies
aimed to apply his Green Book ideas to Libyan society. “Man and woman are equal as human
beings, in religion, in philosophy…in all concerns of humanity. None of them can marry the
other against his or her will or divorce without a just trial…. Discrimination is a flagrant act of
oppression without justification” (Qaddafi, 1979, p. 35).
However, opening the door for women to enter a domain that historically been dominated
by men was seen by the society as a way to “humiliate men. Gaddafi gave women opportunities
but did not respect them” (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015).
Moreover, the call for gender equality and the policies taken by Gaddafi to empower
women’s conditions were meant to promote the ideas presented in his Green Book to the
international society by emphasizing his image as a progressive leader; they did not reflect any
actual improvement on women’s social or political conditions (Bugaighis, 2012). Moreover,
during several interviews made by Le Monde journalist Annick Cojean with former Gaddafi
female guards after the uprising in 2011, claims were made that the truth behind keeping a large
number of female guards and female companions around Gaddafi was to use them as sex slaves.
The testimonies asserted that Gaddafi used women to satisfy his strange sexual habits which
made him desire women of all ages from as young as 15 years old (CNN Arabic, 2012). In her
book, Cojean described how most of the girls in Gaddafi’s personal guard and in the military

79
academy were taken from their homes and schools by force to join Gaddafi’s “harem” after
being chosen by him or by Mabrouka Al-Sharif, head of his personal guards (Cojean, 2013).
Furthermore, the declared progressive polices to improve women’s conditions carried an
underlined disrespect to the norms of the Libyan conservative society. Gaddafi used the public
appearance of female women by his side and his controversial relationship with them as pressure
tools on their families and tribes to remain under his authority to prevent any social scandal if the
details about the real job of those women were revealed to the public. Some sources indicate that
Gaddafi used the same policy towards his closest diplomats and military generals by raping their
spouses or daughters to “dishonor” and blackmail them (France 24, 2012).
The Revolutionary Nuns: True Believers in Gaddafi
Another type of women who were active in the public sphere during Gaddafi’s regime is
the members in Gaddafi’s revolutionary committees, known as “the revolutionary nuns” (Issawi,
2014): a group of women who were very loyal to Gaddafi’s ideology and ideas. A few names can
be fit into this category such as Huda Ben Amer, who is well-known in Libya as “the
executioner,” a name she earned after her participation in a series of public executions the regime
undertook between 1972 and 1985 (Kobeissi, 2011).
Ben Amer gained her infamous reputation after she grabbed a young man’s legs as he
was hanged and pulled them down in an attempt to end his life on live TV broadcasting in 1984
(Kobeissi, 2011). After that incident, Ben Amer became very close to Gaddafi and one of his
“most trusted lieutenants” (Watson, 2011). Throughout 20 years, Ben Amer held different
political positions such as serving as the secretary general of the Women’s Affairs Committee at
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the General People’s Committee, and the speaker of the Arab Parliament. She also served as the
mayor of Benghazi and the secretary general of the people’s Committee for Inspection and
Censorship (Kobeissi, 2011). Ben Amer remained loyal to Gaddafi until the last minute; she fled
the country during the revolution and has no known address.
Another example is Fawzya Shalabey, who was an active member in the revolutionary
committees since the 1970s and very loyal to Gaddafi’s thoughts and ideology and who held the
position of minister of information for years (Issawi, 2014).
For Ben Amer and Shalabey and other women who held prominent positions under
Gaddafi, loyalty to the “leader of the revolution” was a crucial factor in their advancement to
higher positions. In this particular aspect of Gaddafi’s system, men and women had equal
chances in getting promotions. Therefore, women “seriously competed with men for senior
positions. The loyalty to the person of the ‘leader’ and an active engagement in defending and
spreading the revolutionary ideology were the main requirements to access power, and this
equally for women and men” (Issawi, 2014).
The Role of Mass Media
The media as a source of news and information plays an essential role in shaping public’s
political awareness. Consequently, it has considerable influence on people’s beliefs and opinions.
However, under authoritarian regimes, media’s channels become a mobilizing tool and an
instrument to deliver the regime’s messages.
Libya, as a Third World country, had a short history with local media before the coup
took place in September 1969. During the monarchy era there were about five or six private
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newspapers working under the press suppression. The broadcasting service in Libya began in
1957. Television broadcasts, however, did not start until 1968 (one year before the coup) with
almost no significant local programs (Obeidi, 2001). Within the early years after the coup, media
did not provide the expected support for the revolutionary regime. The media structure, which
was inherited from the monarchy, became an object of criticism by Gaddafi. He accused it of
being unsuccessful in publicizing the revolutionary ideology (Obeidi, 2001).
In the late 1970s, the traditional channels of mass media were replaced with a new type
of media presented by Gaddafi as “the Jamahiriyan media.” However, despite the theoretical
prologue to the Jamahiriya media, popular committees in practice were under strict control:
All the information media and the mass media in Libya are supervised by the
Secretary of Information, Culture and Jamahiriyya Mobilization. There are two
types of newspapers. On the one hand, some newspapers express the views of
groups such as students, farmers and professionals…. On the other hand, there are
those newspapers which are not tied to any professional grouping, but are issued
by the revolutionary committees……Television and broadcasting are also
supervised by the Information, Culture and Jamahiriyya Mobilization secretary.
(Obeidi, 2001, p. 55)
The regime used the mass media to spread its ideology domestically and abroad (Obeidi,
2001). Recruiting young girls to enroll in the military was done through televised advertising.
The concept of women in the military was new and challenging to the conservative Libyan
society. Most of the time girls who wanted to join the military academy had to either confront
their families or flee their homes to enroll in the academy against their family’s will (Al-Ta'aeb,
2015). An example is a case of a group of teenagers who left their homes, escaping from
oppressive families during the 1980s; one of them arrived at the academy disguised in men’s
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clothes (Al-Ta'aeb, 2015). The life in the academy was not as they saw on TV; things were
different, and sexual assault was a surprise for them. They questioned the regime’s claims of
advocating women’s rights and reacted with writing and distributing leaflets against Gaddafi
with the help of a military general who himself was against the unethical behavior inside the
academy. The girls were arrested and tortured (Al-Ta'aeb, 2015).
The nature of mass media under Gaddafi’s regime indicates that this important source of
political information has been paralyzed for a long time. The policies taken by the regime
imposing restrictions on the freedom of media, along with allowing one single voice to be heard
through the mass media (the voice of revolution) all played a significant role in pushing people
away from using the information provided by the mass media to shape their opinions. Even
more, the government control over the mass media created a negative relationship and lack of
trust between this important information medium and the mass public. It was used as another tool
of oppression to remind the people of the risks they would take if they thought of challenging the
regime.
The Gradual Effect of Gaddafi’s Policies on Women’s Position in Society
As part of his effort to promote himself as women’s liberator, Gaddafi made progressive
changes in the legal system. He modified the judicial law in order to give women the opportunity
to be promoted to a judge position. Based on this new law, the first female judge, Rafieaa Al
Obiedi, was assigned in 1989.

83
Moreover, Gaddafi passed laws in favor of women such as law 22 in 1991, which states
that it is “Not permissible for a man to marry another woman, without obtaining one of two
conditions, a written consent of the wife or the issuance of a court warrant” (Obeidi, 2013, p. 16).
In addition, Gaddafi did not pass any laws to limit women’s social rights, as he gave
women and men equal rights in areas like education and work. The free education system
provided women with a much-needed opportunity to prove themselves as a qualified partner in
work places. The society took the chance and the percentage of female students enrolled in
public schools reached 98% in 2004 (UNDP, 2005).
The free education system created a positive environment for women to reach new levels
in work places. Increased numbers of women started to enter the work force due to the economic
pressure practiced by the regime (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015). Some
people argue that Gaddafi’s economic policies of shutting down the private sector and limiting
the scope of work in the public sphere had unplanned positive outcomes for women:
In our societies, the public sector is well respected by the community. Therefore,
women have benefited from the closure of the private sector and tended to work
in public sector in large numbers. Even though Gaddafi’s regulations did not
provide freedom and political rights, they actually helped women socially.
Regulations in conservative societies do improve women’s social conditions.
Social change takes centuries to happen whereas legal change is fast. Laws and
regulations are supposed to pull women towards faster social change. (Azza
Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016)
However, despite Gaddafi’s declared ideas about liberating women, his actions and
policies created a negative image for women in the public sphere. That image made women in
senior positions, politically or administratively, a target of cultural disgrace. The negative
reputation surrounding women in high positions made a lot of educated women refrain from

84
following their ambitions in getting promoted in their jobs or even accepting senior positions in
the government because they didn’t want to be in the circle of social attention. This assumption
was reflected in reality through the low representation of women in both legislative and
executive institutions throughout the 42 years of Gaddafi’s rule.
Keeping a low-key profile provided people with a sense of security, as the whole system
was “scary with no sense of security and safety for everyone, especially women. People were
acting “as if they were haunted. They walked beside the walls. People have become alike in their
dress so as not to draw attention. When I came back to Libya, I noticed that all female students in
the law school dressed in black and grey so they won’t stand out in the crowd” (Hana El-Gallal,
personal interview, November 15, 2015).
Furthermore, there was a push by the community for women to work in specific jobs, as
“families started to encourage their daughters to choose ‘less dangerous’ careers like teaching
and men requested their wives to work as teachers or stay home” (Najla Elmangoush, personal
interview, December 5, 2015).
Conclusion
The fear of being associated with the regime or even getting noticed by its leader and his
inner circle was a main reason for the retreating role of women in the public sphere under
Gaddafi’s rule. The major steps of women to become complete partners in building their society,
which started during the monarchy, had a backlash when the image of progressive women was
narrowed to the one in military form who is willing to break all social and cultural rules in order
to satisfy the leader of the “revolution.”
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The Framing Process During the Revolution
The great social and political changes that accompanied the occurrence of the revolution
in Libya played a role in society’s sudden acceptance of Libyan women to be active in areas that
were formerly not accepted by society and had been associated with bad reputations for decades.
Women were socially banned from working in two areas in particular: politics and the media.
Families did not encourage their daughters to work in theses two sectors because “those domains
were perverted. Whoever worked in politics and media ought to have a direct relation with the
corrupt system of Gaddafi. That’s why working in these areas was socially unaccepted, it was a
stigma” (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015).
Breaking this stigma and challenging a long-lasting culture was not an easy task. Making
a change to the society’s perception of women in public space and in these two domains in
particular was inspired by the revolution. Women were
the leaders of the revolution, they were involved on all fronts. The women’s
presence was a message in itself; it showed that our uprising was a popular one.
Throughout our lives, we were taught not to display our capabilities, we were told
to stay in the shadows, and we were always reminded to account for the society’s
reaction for our doings. The revolution broke all those taboos. (Hana El-Gallal,
personal interview, November 15, 2015)
The sudden event of the uprising in mid-February 2011 came as a shock to the
conservative society, and to women themselves. Hana El-Gallal described the new feelings: “I
was surprised myself. I discovered a new Hana in me, another person with exceptional
capabilities” (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015). The new horizons
opened for women through the revolution showed how ready Libyan women were for changes.

86
Zahra’ Langhi, who left Libya at the age of three and lived in exile her whole life, recalled her
first reaction to women’s presence in the revolution:
The first interview I watched when the revolution started was with the attorney
Amal Bugaighis on Alhurra TV. I did not know that there were women in Libya
who knew how to speak and make an argument about the demands for human
rights and constitution and institution building. I thought since the Libyans were
oppressed for so many years, such conceptions would be absen[t]; I was
impressed! (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015)
Breaking the Stigma: Facing the Family
The unexpected public role of the Libyan women in the beginning of the revolution
brought women under the spotlight. This new reality required exceptional will to break the longlasting cultural traditions, which had limited women’s role in the society for such a long time.
Women’s challenges had different levels. In order to challenge the societal norms and traditions,
the women of Libya had to face the authority of the patriarchal figure in their family first. That
figure can take the image of a father, brother, or husband. Being part of a patriarchal society,
seeking the approval of that figure was important for two main reasons: first, to provide support
and help her with her new roles, and second, to provide protection to her from the society which
might not accept this sudden change positively. Shahrazad Kablan, the first female anchor to
appear on TV during the revolution and a leader of a successful campaign in support of the
implementation of the No Fly Zone in Libya, summed up this social need for approval:
If a woman in our society did not have a husband, a father, or a brother to support
her and stand behind her brave decisions to get involved in public space, women
would not be able to do what they have done in the revolution. There should be a
platform to thank those men who supported their wives, sisters, and daughters in
breaking those old traditions because they (the men) would receive most of the
criticism. The easiest thing people would say is that he is not a “man” because he
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allowed his female relative to have an active public role. A man should have
special qualities to be in that position; he must be very strong to face the society’s
backlash on him. (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
The women interviewed for this project, who come from different social backgrounds,
provide different accounts for family reactions with regard to their involvement in the early days
of the revolution. However, they all agreed that their family’s approval was a priority for them
when they decided to participate in the revolution. Hana El-Gallal, who lived most of her life
abroad and came back to Libya three years before the revolution, stated that since her return she
kept a low social profile and she “did not know anyone; I had low social contacts, my social
network was limited to the faculty of the law school. Women were always hunted with a feeling
that anyone can hurt them” (Hana El-Gallal, ersonal interview, November 15, 2015).
However, Hana disregarded all previous restraints when she left her home on February
17, 2011 to go to the courthouse to join the protestors. She did not tell her conservative family
she was going. When her brothers found out, they called her and told her to wait for one of them
to come to the courthouse to follow her home. Hana recalled that day:
When I arrived home, I was worr[ied] my brothers would give me [a] hard time for
leaving the house without telling them and they would ask me not to do it again.
What happened was the opposite! They sat down with me to discuss the plans for
[the] next day. They supported me and we coordinated together. (Hana El-Gallal,
personal interview, November 15, 2015)
The BBC interviewed Hana on the third day of the uprising. She put herself and her
family at risk when she gave her full name in the interview. At that critical time, her father and
brother were in Tripoli and managed to escape a day before Gaddafi’s forces arrested them

88
because of her. Her father’s office was destroyed and her picture was hung there by Gaddafi’s
men as a threat message (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015).
Hana claims that hers was not a unique case, as many other women went through similar
experiences with their families. At that time “the social differences between men and women
dissolved, societal barriers all collapsed in an instant, there was that collective feeling we all
shared together; the feeling of freedom” (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15,
2015).
Najla Elmangoush confirms Hana’s reading of the society. Najla never thought she would
be part of an event as big as a revolution. As a divorced mother of two little girls, her movements
were socially restrained. She gave all credit to her family, who supported her decision of going to
the courthouse to protest. She explained that it only took her one conversation with her father to
convince him of her decision.
It was a hard decision but it was also a patriotic issue; we did not need to argue about it.
My father went with me to the courthouse on the first day; he examined the place and
made sure the people there were trustworthy and then he let me go on my own since then.
My mother never opposed my decision; when I was working in the courthouse for long
hours each day, she was taking care of my daughters without complaining. (Najla
Elmangoush, personal interview, December 5, 2015)
Najla was not the only interviewee who praised her mother’s support for her in the
revolution. Iman Bugaighis stated that her mother’s role was essential for her to continue her
contribution in the awakening of the revolution:
While I was at the courthouse the whole day with my sister and brother, my
mother was at home taking care of our kids. She knew how serious and dangerous
the situation was but she never asked us to quit, even when we would lose contact
with her for a whole day, she would remain strong. She endured Gaddafi’s slander
campaign against our family and stood up to my husband when he asked me once
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to slow down and keep a low profile. I remember she told him this is her country
and this is her duty. (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015)
Families’ support for their female members in the revolution was a clear challenge to the
norms and traditions which had ruled the society for so long. When Shahrazad Kablan called her
brother in Benghazi in the first few days of the revolution and told him that she was asked to go
on Al-Jazeera TV and she was worried about her family in Libya, he told her to go out and
speak: “He said that they broke the wall of fear and Benghazi would not kneel to Gaddafi again.
He supported me and my husband supported me” (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March
6, 2016).
Nadine Nasrat, a married activist and a mother of four, also emphasized the importance
of the approval of the male figure in her life, in this case her husband, who understands and
respects her work even though he is against it because he is worried about her safety. She
stressed that “if it wasn’t my husband, I would not be here. I have four kids; if he is not the type
of person who is willing to help and take care of the kids, I would have not been able to do what
I am doing and continue in it. He is very supportive; he helps me in taking decisions and always
gives me his advice” (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015).
Breaking the Stigma: Facing the Society
The extreme transformation of Libyan women from being limited to traditional roles in a
conservative society to handle the most progressive roles during the revolution in areas like
politics and the media could be understood by the performative and transformative cultural
approach, which argues that “social movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape
and reshape it” (Johnson & Klandermans, 1995, p. 9). For the performative view, culture is a
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“tool kit” that includes all habits, symbols, styles and norms, all of which people of the society
agreed to and used to construct their social actions (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). However, during
crises and dramatic social changes the old cultural system could be rejected and replaced by new
cultural models through which the society learns to practice “unfamiliar habits until they become
familiar” (Swidler, 1986, p. 278). In this case, the performative culture turns into a
transformative one.
Shahrazad Kablan is an example of a pioneer woman, being the first female to break a
longtime stigma in Libyan society with regard to women’s work in the media. Shahrazad, who
worked s a teacher and educator in the U.S. for many years, was the first female anchor on the
first non-governmental TV station, Libya Alahrar TV that was launched in Doha, Qatar on
March 30, 2011 in support of the Libyan revolution. Entering a work field that was regarded as a
disgrace in a conservative society like Libya would not be considered an option for Shahrazad
under regular circumstances.
However, when she received a phone call from Mahmoud Shammam, a prominent
journalist and a long-time opponent of the Gaddafi regime, asking her to join the new TV
channel which was to be broadcast from Qatar, she did not hesitate. She explained her decision:
“At that time I did not think of my life, my work, my kids, all my life was devoted to one thing:
my country which was in danger. I was so passionate about my cause” (Shahrazad Kablan,
personal interview, March 6, 2016). Shahrazad recalled her husband’s reaction when she
informed him about the offer she received, which required her to travel across the world to work
in a TV station:
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I was still in Washington, D.C. and he was back home in Ohio with the kids. When
I told him about the offer he did not hesitate a second: he said “Go!” It was a most
pleasant surprise. He has always been supportive but that was a big decision. He
even prepared my suitcase for me and paid all my travel expenses.
(Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
When Shahrazad accepted the offer to work in the revolutionary TV station, she did not
know what her job would be. She thought she would be an editor behind the scenes. However,
when she arrived in Qatar, she found that the people in charge of the station did not have a clear
vision on what to do. “I would ask, what are the plans? How you will make this channel work?
And they would say, we still don’t know” (Shahrazad Kablan, Personal interview, March 6,
2016). When she was asked to be the anchor of a TV show named “Libya: The People,” she
agreed despite her lack of experience in TV work and media in general. On that show, Shahrazad
would hold an hour of live TV during which she would talk about the situation in Libya, receive
phone calls, and read messages from all over the country.
When I started the show, I did not stop to think if going on TV was the right thing
to do or not. I was not thinking of the society’s reaction to me as a female TV
presenter. The youth were dying in Libya, our beloved country was in danger, and
the situation was greater than the snags of the society. It was our duty to liberate
our country; people were giving their lives; going on TV was the least I could do.
(Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
Shahrazad’s show started on March 30, 2011 and lasted for six months. The show was
very successful and gained a large base of popularity in Libyan society; people called her “the
lady who embraced the country.” Shahrazad remembered her feelings during the show: “I was
very honest, I spoke from my heart and the people felt it” (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview,
March 6, 2016). Shahrazad claimed that the reaction of the Libyan society to her show came as a
surprise for her.
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I felt the people’s support from the beginning. People did not care about who I
am or how I dress, they focused on my message. What I did shocked the
society, but it was a positive shock. I changed people’s perception about women
in media; people became more accepting and I opened the door for other
females to enter the domain. I received a lot of encouraging messages. People
would send me messages saying that I am their hope for a future Libya without
Gaddafi. I remember receiving a letter from a woman saying that I have a
“clean” face unlike Gaddafi’s people. Her words moved me so much because I
finally conversed the image that Gaddafi managed to implement about Libyans
as ignorant, unsophisticated, and [un]civilized. I proved that Libyans are refined
people. At that time, I felt that [it was] my duty not just to fight Gaddafi, but
also to fight the longtime misconception people had about women in media.
(Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
Even though Shahrazad understood her effect on Libyan society and the profound culture
of disgrace to women in the media, she stated that she did not realize the level of that effect until
she visited Libya for the first time after the revolution ended. She arrived at the Tripoli airport in
December 2011to attend women’s workshops and she expected people from the Free Generation
Movement to welcome her in the airport. She was surprised when she left the airplane to find a
myriad of people standing in the runway holding welcome banners and chanting the
national anthem for me. It was a magical moment; I cried and my feeling was a mix of
joy and fear. When I hosted the TV show I never thought I would be famous; I felt the
appreciation in the eyes of the people who followed me to the hotel. Thousands of people
came to say hello and thank me. (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
The last show aired in September right after the fall of Tripoli into the hands of the
revolutionary forces. Shahrazad explained the reasons behind ending her program:
After freeing Tripoli from Gaddafi’s control, my job was done… media was not
my domain. Plus, there was so much politics going on behind the scenes. The
people in charge of the station tried to change the show’s message and I wanted to
keep the original one, which aimed to create a platform for all Libyans. I used to
read a poem at the end of each show...those poems were sent to me from all over
Libya. My strategy was to read a poem from a different city each day. Apparently,
the producers had different agendas, as they wanted me to focus on certain cities
and ignore others, the thing which was unacceptable for me. The differences in
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vision between us were a real challenge. For instance, I refused to follow the
station’s request to call Gaddafi bad names. I insisted [on] referring to him by his
name, I wanted to be factual; I did not want to use the same demeanors Gaddafi
used with his enemies. My goal was to set the base for a new culture of
differences. (Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016)
In addition, Shahrazad did not want to risk the trust she gained from the Libyan people.
Despite the fact that, unlike the majority of Libyan women, Shahrazad did not wear a headscarf,
her dress code was modest and reflected her conservative background. Therefore, she refused the
requests made by the station’s new Lebanese producers to change her look and “[loosen up] my
modest dress code; I told them, ‘If you want me to work here, I am going to dress this way’”
(Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2016).
Despite the fact that some of the social restrictions on women’s public roles claim a
religious base for their validity, those restrictions were disregarded during the revolution, not just
by women but also by religious authorities that praised women’s active role during the
revolution. Iman Bugaighis provided an example of the notable transition in the socio/cultural
acceptance of women in public sphere during the revolution:
My sister Salwa and I are liberals in the Libyan society. We don’t wear headscarves but
at the same time we are earnest and very respectful to others and ourselves. One day
during the revolution, a religious scholar came to our workstation in the courthouse with
his two daughters. He pointed at me and said, talking to his daughters, when you grow up
I want you to be like her…He did not see me unveiled, he saw me as a strong, capable
woman. That situation proved to me that our society needed a big event like the
revolution to change the prominent culture. (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview,
November 4, 2016)
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Sexual Violence: Systematic Act or Limited Behavior?
Even though rape has been a flagrant act in wars throughout history, the recent
documentation of rape crimes during contemporary wars gave the issue more attention on the
international level, which was confirmed with the UN 1820 resolution in 2008 stating that “rape
and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a
constitutive act with respect to genocide” (UN Security Council, 2008).
In ethnic and civil conflicts, rape is used systematically for psychological and
sociological reasons. The sexual attack of women during wartime has a psychological
component to show the men in the other fighting group that they are too weak to protect and
defend their community (Amnesty International, 2004), especially when the crimes are
committed in front of the victim’s family. In addition, the act of rape against women of a
particular community aims to humiliate the whole group, as women are often seen as “the
reproducers and carriers of the community” (smith-Spark, 2004) and their rape will therefore
bring social dishonor upon their entire family (Amnesty International, 2004) and on the
community at large.
Cases of rape crimes against women have been reported during armed conflicts in
countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, and Uganda (UNICEF, 1996). During the civil war
in the former Yugoslavia, for instance, more than 20,000 Bosnian Muslim women and girls were
raped and deliberately impregnated to force the girls “to bear ‘the enemy’s’ child” (UNICEF,
1996).
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However, in many of these cases, especially ones in conservative societies, war victims
of rape are treated by their community as carriers of shame and disgrace for their families, which
prevents a large number of rape victims from reporting these incidents out of fear of being
dishonored. The refrainment from reporting rape cases makes rape one of the most effective
psychological weapons in the contemporary world.
Libya was not an exception. Evidence of systematic rape committed by Gaddafi’s forces
against women in different parts of Libya during the revolution were reported and documented
by different news sources. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis MorenoOcampo, opened an investigation on the issue. The high sensitivity of the issue of rape in general
and in the Libyan conservative society in particular made it one of the taboos to be discussed and
investigated. Talking in public about rape crimes committed during the Libyan revolution against
Gaddafi was an unusual topic.
All news reports and documented cases are centered on the allegations of one person:
Doctor Seham Sergewa, a female psychologist who worked in Benghazi’s Psychiatric Hospital
and carried out the first and only on-the-ground investigation with regard to war-related rape
crimes. Doctor Sergewa claimed that she came across the first case of rape a few weeks after the
start of the revolution when she received a phone call from the mother of a young girl who was
kidnapped in Ajdabiea, a city to the west of Benghazi, which was a war zone between the
revolutionaries and Gaddafi forces. Sergewa stated that the girl told her that she was kidnapped
by three to four men, raped few times, and then left in the desert (Sergewa, 2011).
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After receiving the first report, Sergewa started her investigations, searching for evidence
of systematic rape. She travelled to Libyan refugee camps on the borders of Tunisia and Egypt
and began a mental health survey to identify more rape victims. Sergewa claimed that out of
50,000 survey results, 295 women answered yes to a question asked if they were raped, and they
all accused Gaddafi’s soldiers of that crime. She also personally interviewed 140 victims (Fahim,
2011). Sergewa recalled one of the victims telling her, “They tied up my husband, and they raped
me in front of him, and they killed him” (Sergewa, 2011). Another story was told by an 18-yearold accusing Gaddafi’s militias of tying up her father and brothers and raping her in front of her
entire family (Sergewa, 2011). Sergewa believed that the numbers of rape victims are much
higher than the ones she managed to document, but social shame and psychological trauma
stopped the victims from disclosing what happened to them.
However, Seham Sergewa’s research methods came under criticism by her colleagues.
Some of them argued that it is “unlikely that she could have distributed so many surveys, even in
the best of times” (Fahim, 2011). The head of Benghazi’s Psychiatric Hospital, Dr. Ali M.
Elroey, who found Sergewa’s results to be “a bit exaggerated,” stated that the female doctor was
not willing to share her research for peer review” (Fahim, 2011).
Other criticism focused on the negative social impact the publication of Sergewa’s
research had, especially with the media attention given to the issue. Essam Gheriani, a
psychologist who worked with victims of sexual violence, stated that “The rape question is
highly sensitive everywhere in the world, and even more so in a conservative society like ours”
(Fahim, 2011). He asserted that the publicity of the issue brought by Sergewa discouraged more
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victims from coming forward (Fahim, 2011). In her response, Sergewa claimed that some of her
colleagues tried to underestimate her research on sexual violence because she was exposing a
social taboo that Libyan society is not yet prepared for. She even accused the head of Benghazi’s
Psychiatric Hospital, Dr. Elroey, of obstructing her research by locking up her papers in her
office at the hospital (Fahim, 2011).
Other than Sergewa’s assertions about rape crimes during the revolution, there was a
dearth of material evidence to prove those crimes. One video aired on Anderson Cooper’s show
in March 2011 showed a woman being sexually assaulted by two to three men, allegedly from
Gaddafi’s forces (CNN, 2011b). The revolutionary forces claimed that they found condoms and
Viagra pills in the vehicles they seized from Gaddafi’s militias. They also claimed that they
found a large number of rape video recorded on cellphones found with detained Gaddafi forces.
However, all those videos were destroyed based on the orders of the revolutionary leaders to
save the women on the videos and their families from social disgrace. Abdullah Alkabeer, one of
the revolutionary leaders in Misurata (a city with most of the alleged rape crimes during the
war), stated that the revolutionaries “don’t care if they are evidence of war crimes; rape is a
heinous crime, it does not just destroy the victim, it destroys the whole family. Therefore, all
those videos were given to a revolutionary leader named Muhamad Halbous, who was in charge
of destroying all of them personally” (CNN, 2011a).
Social constraints and the culture of silence along with “the lack of reliable statistics, the
evident use of torture to extract confessions, and the political sensitivity of the issue” (Human
Rights Council, 2012, p. 14) all made the confirmation of systematic rape hard to achieve. The
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International Commission of Inquiry on Libya Report made by the Human Rights Council
(2012) stated the difficulties in confirming institutionalized rape episodes. However, the
Commission confirmed the occurrence of two patterns of sexual violence committed by the
Gaddafi forces during the revolution. The first pattern was when women were beaten and raped
by armed men, either in their homes or elsewhere. According to the Commission report, some of
the victims were targeted because they were from opposing cities or for their relationship to the
revolutionary fighters, and others for no known reason. In this pattern, sexual assault is
considered to be a “means to punish, terrorize, and a message to those who supported the
revolution” (Human Rights Council, 2012, p. 14).
The second pattern reported by the Commission is sexual violence and torture of men and
women in detention centers in order to “extract information, humiliate, and punish” the victims
(Human Rights Council, 2012, p. 14). The Commission also referred to limited evidence of
sexual violence committed by the revolutionary forces against Gaddafi loyal females (Human
Rights Council, 2012).
The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya Report concluded by stating that
investigating rape crimes in Libya during the revolution was their most difficult task (Human
Rights Council, 2012). The report highlighted the effect of sexual violence on Libyan society
when stating that
Some female victims of rape have been ostracized, divorced, disowned, forced to
flee the country, have committed suicide, and some have allegedly been killed by
their relatives because of the shame and dishonour that rape brings to the family
and even the tribe. The silence surrounding rape existed before the conflict as
well. In several conservative areas of Libya, female victims have been pressured
or threatened by their community to remain silent about rape, as it is considered
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shameful for the community not to have been able to protect its own women.
(Human Rights Council, 2012, pp. 139-140)
In spite of the fact that rape and sexual assault are taboo in Libyan society, a young
woman broke that taboo in the loudest way possible. Iman Obiedi, a law graduate from Benghazi
who was working in a law office in Tripoli, burst into a hotel in Tripoli late March 2012 in which
foreign media representatives were gathering and started screaming and accusing Gaddafi’s
forces of gang-raping her. She showed bruises and dark marks on her body to prove her story.
She claimed that 15 of Gaddafi’s forces took turns assaulting her after she was stopped at a
checkpoint in Tripoli. She said that they raped her because her ID stated that she is from
Benghazi, the revolutionary city. She also claimed that other girls were raped with her, one of
whom, who helped her escape, was no older than 15 years old (Basu, 2012).
Iman’s story became the center of the international news, especially after she was brutally
removed from the hotel by Gaddafi intelligence under the eyes of the world. She was accused by
the regime of being a drunken prostitute in an attempt to downplay her story. However, the effect
of Iman’s story on the Libyan conservative society came as a surprise. An overwhelming wave
of sympathy was expressed toward the young victim. Libyans considered her a hero—they
respected her courage of coming forward to expose the actions of Gaddafi’s thugs. As described
in the media, Obeidi “drew sympathy and fame, her image painted for the public on a canvas of
courage” (Basu, 2012).
In summary, the relationship between the revolution in Libya as a major event, and
women as participants in that event, is a two-way relationship. Women were the spark that
initiated the uprising and the fuel that helped it endure and succeed. At the same time, the
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revolution provided women with the means to break long-lasting social restraints and change a
prominent culture and system that had long viewed women as backseat riders who are not able to
make real contributions to the public sphere. Women had challenges on different levels. They
challenged the political system as part of the whole revolutionary wave. They also had to create a
new space for themselves in society. They exposed themselves to new challenges as they acted
against the profound social perception of public roles for women. Those challenges included
breaking the taboos of subjects like rape and some debated religious views of women’s public
role.
The Framing Process After the Revolution
The question remains whether all the changes and gains achieved by women during the
revolution are momentary or the changes in the social perception of women are enduring. The
social perception of women in Libya after the revolution is discussed in this section.
The end of the revolutionary momentum and the beginning of the state-building process
is marked with the liberation speech which was delivered by Mustafa Abduljaleel, the chair of
the NTC, on October 23, 2011. The speech was expected to draw the path for the post-liberation
phase and set the tone for the next step in state building. However, the speech brought
disappointment to many female activists when Abduljaleel announced that he was dropping “the
right of [a] woman to sign a document allowing her husband to marry again, adding that he will
work to issue a law that does not prevent a man from polygamy” (Obeidi, 2013, p. 16). The
interviewees for this research considered the speech a setback with regard to women’s social
status. The declaration, coming from the highest authority in the country at that time, opened the
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door for consequential court cases and called for lifting the bans on second marriages and the
appeals submitted claiming the unconstitutional cases of women working as judges (Azza
Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016). Some voices even called the female judges “judges
of Gaddafi,” and threats to those judges were received (Obeidi, 2013, p. 17).
Abduljaleel’s public degradation of women was repeated during the handover ceremony to
transfer power from the NTC to the newly elected General National Congress on August 9, 2012.
Abduljaleel publicly expelled Sara Misselatey, the female presenter of the ceremony, and
ordered her to leave the stage because she was not wearing the hijab. He even defended his
decision during his speech, which he delivered at the event, stressing that “We believe in
individual freedoms and will endeavor to consolidate them, but we are Muslims and are sticking
to our values. Everyone should understand this point” (Sudaress, 2012).
Women’s Participation in the New Political System
On the public level, signs of regression regarding women’s public presence started early
after liberation. Women were told on different occasions to give up public engagement in favor
of going back to their homes (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November, 13, 2015). Iman
Bugaighis, the first spokesperson of NTC, confirmed the new trend: “I was participating in a
demonstration three months after the liberation when I came across a group of young men. They
kept saying stuff like ‘This is enough, the revolution has ended; go back to your homes.’ A lot of
people wanted the social status of women to retreat to what it was before the revolution” (Iman
Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015).
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The call for a limited role for women in politics came from different sides, from Islamist
political groups and armed militias to some male GNC members. Examples of violations against
women politicians ranged from verbal abuse to assassination. Mohamed Kilani, a member in the
GNC, demanded the women members to be seated in a different room from men because “GNC
members are distracted by their colleagues who wore make up, dressed indecently and mingled
with men” (LWPP, 2014). Another incident happened when a member in the GNC physically
attacked a female GNC member because she disagreed with him. The same person is now the
leader of Dawn of Libya Operation, the biggest militia group in Tripoli (LWPP, 2014).
Female members of the Council of Representatives received their share of threats and
attacks as well. Houses of some female representatives and candidates were robbed and burned.
Other female representatives received threats to burn down their houses (LWPP, 2014).
The obstacles for women’s political participation go beyond the traditional perception of
women; the lack of security and the absence of the rule of law with the extreme levels of
violence among the unchecked militias, the rise of the extremist Islamist groups, and the
increased number of war crimes are all indicators of the challenges women politicians are facing.
The Position of Religious Authorities Regarding Women’s Rights
The Supreme Mufti, Alsadiq Al Gheriani, issued several fatwas to limit women’s rights
to travel, put restrictions on their marriage choices, and even force a dress code on them. The
fatwas called on the government to ban women from traveling alone without a chaperone and
required the government to pass a law to ban the marriage of Libyan women to foreigners. The
Mufti also declared that female teachers “should cover their faces if they are teaching teenage
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boys” (LWPP, 2014). Incidents of verbal and physical attacks against women based on the
previous fatwas were reported in different cities in the country, one of which is the case of a
university professor who was harassed by members of a Security Support Unit in Tripoli because
“she was travelling in a car with her driver, un-chaperoned by a mehrem (male relative or
guardian)” (LWPP, 2014).
In addition, other fatwas issued by the Supreme Mufti called for separating male and
female students in educational institutions for all ages (Obeidi, 2013, p. 17). Some of those
fatwas were translated into action in different places in Libya. An example is Omar Almukhtar
University in the city of Derna when a local extreme militia built a separation wall in the middle
of the university’s campus and wrote signs around campus warning male students from
interacting with female students at the university (France 24, 2014).
The Effect of Salwa’s Murder on Women’s
Social Status and Political Activities
The assassination of the lawyer and human rights activist Salwa Bugaighis in her house
in Benghazi on June 25, 2014 was a defining moment for women’s activism in post-revolution
Libya. Her death ended the momentum Libyan women had had since the revolution in 2011. It
was not an ordinary criminal case against a human being; it was “the starting point of a new era.
Her murder was the first in Libya against a woman, the first that happen[ed] inside the victim’s
house, and it was the first time in Libya that the sanctity of a home is violated” (Hana El-Gallal,
personal interview, November 15, 2015).
Salwa’s murder affected women’s political activism significantly; women activists were
under societal and familial pressure to stop or reduce their activities:
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The assassination of Salwa affected me personally; my husband and my father asked me
to decrease my political activities and keep a low profile on social media, especially with
the daily threats I was receiving every day. I called the UN and they told me to take those
threats seriously, especially after the murder of Salwa and Fareeha Berkaoey and that I
was not the only activist who was receiving threats. (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview,
November, 13, 2015)
Since Salwa’s death, women’s activism witnessed a substantial decrease, as most female
activists fled the country: “Security is a big issue; the death of Salwa was a shock for me, [and] I
entered a state of depression after her death. I was not afraid before but after her death I was
afraid; I had to leave the country like others, hoping to come back one day when it’s safe enough
for us to work there” (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview, December 5, 2015).
Moreover, some activists see the effect of Salwa’s murder goes beyond the position of
women in politics and public space to affect women’s social status in general. The murder of
Salwa in her own home was
a fatal blow to the social status of women in Libya. Now there is no respect for women
on the streets. Women lost that special place in society. For example, women used to get
help if they had a flat tire; this does not exist anymore. A friend of mine had a minor car
accident with one of the self-proclaimed revolutionists; he and his friends wrecked her
car before her eyes and people in the street did not get involved. (Azza Maghur, personal
interview, May 11, 2016)
Azza Maghur admitted that she felt the changes in the perception of women’s
engagement in the public sphere since the liberation speech of Abduljaleel. However, she faced a
direct threat when she started a project called “She and the Sports” where she created a group of
female cyclists who would go out on the streets of Tripoli and ride their bikes every Friday. Then
they decided to expand their project and make it
more sophisticated by throwing a “women’s sport day at the beach” for which we
obtained all the security permissions from the municipality of Tripoli. We cleaned
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the beach, brought balls and water for the participants; we brought female doctors
to provide basic health checkups for the participants. We had the whole beach for
us that day and it was a huge success. However, at the same night of the event, I
received a phone call from an anonymous person threating to kill me for planning
the event and mobilizing women to participate in it, it was a direct death threat.
(Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016)
Moreover, cases of violations against female activists were reported. The reports included
threats and attacks on female lawyers and human rights activists and on the offices of some
women’s NGOs in different cities (LWPP, 2014). The Libyan women-rights activist Majdoline
Ebeidah is an example of the dangerous conditions under which women activists are working.
Ebeidah was one of the young Libyan girls who helped in delivering supplies to the
revolutionists during the revolution, and after the liberation she continued her work demanding
equal rights for women. Ebeidah had to flee the country to the UK after a militia of
fundamentalists kidnapped her twice (Hooyuel, 2012). The group members kept Ebeidah in the
militia base for few days, during which she was beaten and threatened. According to Ebeidah,
“the man kept telling me, ‘I’ll kill you here and no one will know your way’ and I thought they
would kill me in that place” (Hooyuel, 2012).
In summary, women in Libya are facing great challenges; they are at risk of losing the
gains they managed to accomplish during the revolution and returning to the back seat. The
threats do not come only from the long-term societal traditions and perceptions, which view
women as passive members and second-class citizens; rather, women are dragged into the new
power conflict, which includes armed militias and clashing political ideologies. The price women
are paying to protect their rights is high and it comes in complete absence of the law and an
absolute failure by the consecutive governments to control the ongoing violence.
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Conclusion
The role played by women in the revolution connected the event to women in the
collective mind of Libyan society. Therefore, the success of the revolutionary powers against
Gaddafi helped empower the new social status of women in the society. However, the chaos and
disorder that followed the end of the revolution took away from women’s gains, as “the
revolution in Libya is linked to women. The failure of the post-revolution era pulled away a lot
of confidence gained by women during the revolution and men used this mode against women
and blamed them, especially in light of the lack of security conditions which have occurred”
(Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015).
The new cultural habits that emerged during the revolution gave Libyan women a larger
role in public space. Those changes were not viewed by the Libyan society as permanent cultural
changes. Instead, they were treated as a revolutionary necessity, which should not be carried over
when the revolution ended. This perception presents challenges to the future role of women in
the public arena and civic activities: the role which was challenged by the increased influence of
newly emerged powers of militant groups and Islamist extremists which affiliate with some
political parties and some members of the government. Five years after the revolution, women’s
rights are undermined and targeting female activists has become a frequent and normal act. To
prevent women from having a bigger role in society, tools from verbal attacks to harassment and
abductions are used.

CHAPTER 7
MOBILIZING STRUCTURE
Mobilizing structure represents the structural approach to social movements. The formal
and informal organizations, the internal and external structure of the movement’s context are all
main factors in the success of the mobilization process.
Studying the emergence and evolvement of women’s movements in Libya, which took
off largely after the revolution against Gaddafi’s dictatorship in February 2011, requires
expanding the scope of analysis to cover the whole picture of the Libyan context.
The dynamics of women’s movements in Libya and their struggle to build institutions
that are representatives of women is similar to the dynamics of a cogwheel in a clock. It has its
own forcing power, yet, its circulation cannot be completely understood without looking at the
whole machine and recognizing the position, size, and rotation of that gear within the clock and
the importance of that part for the functionality of the whole clock. Therefore, it is important to
highlight the institutional structure in Libya before the revolution.
Political Institutions under Gaddafi’s Regime
Throughout the 42 years of Gaddafi’s regime, the political structure of Libya, including
the institutional system, was subject to a variety of tryouts by Gaddafi, who intended to apply his
ideological thoughts, introduced in his Green Book, into the Libyan reality. He substituted the
political institutions established during the monarchy era with “experimental and ephemeral
institutions” (El-Kikhia, 1997, p. 147) in an attempt to secure the survival of his rule. It is not an
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exaggeration to say that during his 42-year rule Gaddafi succeeded in establishing a stateless
society.
It is important to stress that Gaddafi, and not the political institutions of the state, was
the principal for the political chaos in Libya considering the fact that “Political institutions do not
have legitimacy except through his blessing” (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980, p. 213). Therefore,
when the revolution broke in February 2011 and after the overthrow of Gaddafi, the Libyans
faced a great challenge of rebuilding their state institutions.
The political system introduced to the Libyans by Gaddafi could theoretically be
considered a golden opportunity for the mass public to be politically engaged through the formal
channels of basic popular congresses (BPCs) which provided people, according to the Third
Universal Theory, with the power to have control over all aspects of their lives and made
ordinary citizens the prime decision makers in the country. However, in practice, people in Libya
were not interested in attending the BPCs, and if they did, they were not actively participating in
the congresses’ sessions. This passivity emerged from several factors (Obeidi, 2001, pp. 142147):
a) Some people did not participate in the new political system because they felt
uncomfortable facing this new experiment, or participated but were not active during the
discussions.
b) The role of Gaddafi himself, who was involved in every decision taken in the country by
establishing a unique political system in which he did not have a formal role as a
traditional head of state but at the same time he was the real decision maker.
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c) Some people were discouraged by the activities of the revolutionary committees, which
mishandled their obligations and turned out to be the dominant group over the BPC’s
sessions.
One of the original responsibilities of the revolutionary committees, according to Gaddafi,
was to “encourage the Popular Congresses to intensify their ideological work, to help the masses
make progressive decisions and to get such decisions implemented by the People’s Committees”
(Obeidi, 2001, p. 142). However, practice proved to be very different from theory. A large sector
of the population was convinced that the “help” provided by revolutionary committees in
decision-making was in fact a sign of their domination over the BPCs. An example of the
revolutionary committees’ control over the public formal channel of political participation is
when they “intervened in the work of the PCs by putting forward their own candidates, who were
enthusiastic admirers of the leader of the revolution and were committed to furthering the goals
of the revolution. In doing so, the revolutionary committees usually objected to other candidates
and prevented the Popular Congresses from operating as they should” (Obeidi, 2001, p. 146).
Gaddafi relied a great deal on the protection role played by the revolutionary committees,
which became stronger over time due to the power provided to them by the leader of the
revolution. By the end of the 1990s “the 40,000 members of the revolutionary committees,
together with the 40,000 soldiers of the Jamahiriya guard, were the bedrock of Gaddafi’s power”
(Martinez, 2007, p. 91).
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Political Parties and Civil Society
In order for the mass public to actively participate in the political system, people of a
society need information sources. Normally, those sources would include institutions like
political parties and civil society organizations. Such a healthy political environment, where
citizens receive political information through political elites and party representatives and adopt
the political ideology they prefer, was missing from the Libyan political scene, where there was
only one ideology to follow and only one political choice to take. In his Green Book, Gaddafi
depicted the political party as the contemporary dictatorial tool of governing and the party
system as an obvious form of autocracy (Obeidi, 2001, p. 140).
Political elites and traditional politicians were abbreviated in the Libyan case into the
revolutionary committees, which were sturdily committed to one ideology and were not willing
to give space to any other political thoughts.
Other institutions that normally contribute in shaping political behavior of the mass
public including “networks, groups, and other social formations that largely determine their
opportunities for the exchange of meaningful political information” (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987,
p. 1197) were also missing from the Libyan political system.
To ensure the absence of other political alternatives, the Libyan regime attempted to
Abolish political parties, trade unions and professional groups and associations
(such as the lawyers’ union). Within months of the overthrow of the monarchy the
press was heavily censored and citizens of the new state were advised not to
express public views hostile to the military leadership. (Simons, 1993, p. 192)
Even more, the revolutionary leadership issued the “Decision in the protection of the
Revolution” right after a planned coup was uncovered in December 1969. This resolution
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asserted that increasing falsehood, or participating in strikes and demonstrations, was considered
to be a criminal offence to proselytize against the state, and an attempt to provoke class hatred
(Simons, 1993).
In short, the political environment in Libya lost all meanings of diversity and the regular
state institutions were constricted. Social interactions such as unions and associations, even
entertaining clubs, were all eliminated. The only institution available to people to express their
opinions was the basic popular congresses, where people had to praise the regime’s ideology.
Even the very few organizations which were permitted to be formed and work within the
system were expected to follow the revolutionary objectives. Those organizations, normally
representing particular legal interests, included “The Women’s Union, The Students’ Union, The
Judges’ Association, The Lawyers’ Union, The Doctors’ Union, The Producers’ Union, The
Union of Farmers, and The Union of Libyan Writers and Literati” (Mattes, 2008, p. 62).
Women’s Organizations
The selective nature of women’s organizations made the membership of those
establishments exclusive to women who believed in and adopted the regime’s ideology.
Therefore, those organizations were subject to dissolution if they were to move away from the
ideological and mobilizing path drawn for them by the regime (Obeidi, 2013).
To make sure that civil society’s organizations and sector unions were acting within the
system of Jamahiriya, the regime required that the formation of any new organization must be
made through the Secretariat of Public Security to ensure that proposed organizations shared the
same aims and ideology of the regime (Mattes, 2008).
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Charities were also included in the forbidden organizations unless the charity was
associated with the regime. The reason for that is that the regime did not recognize the poor and
needy in Libya and always claimed that there was no poverty in Libya (Jameela Hwaiow,
personal interview, April 3, 2016). Several women’s groups attempted to form charity
organizations over the years but their requests were rejected. Moreover, in order for their
association to be accepted, “they had to change the title of their projects from charity and care for
the needy to social solidarity to move it from being a charity to [a] social development type of
organization; that was the only way we could form any social organization” (Jameela Hwaiow,
personal interview, April 3, 2016).
Gaddafi’s daughter, Aisha, formed the first charity association in 2001 with goals of
caring for the poor and needy outside Libya, such as Africa, Bosnia, and other poor countries.
Since then, every charity organization has had to have connections with Aisha’s charity in order
to get permission to operate. Jameela Hwaiow, a co-founder of the Sanabel El-Hedaya
Organization, one of a handful of self-funded organizations founded during the Gaddafi era,
recalled that when they applied for permission to form their organization, their request was
rejected because some of the names included in the charity’s founders had a long history of
opposing the regime: “The only way for us to get approved and start provid[ing] services to the
poor and needy was to operate as a branch of another organization in Tripoli headed by one of
Gaddafi’s close men; we had to agree to that in order to be approved, this was the case for all
other charity organizations” (Jameela Hwaiow, personal interview, April 3, 2016).
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The nature of the political structure under Gaddafi’s regime did not differentiate
between citizens with regard to their duties toward the system. All adult citizens were required to
attend the BPCs and they were all under the threat of punishment if they did not. Women’s
attendance was mandatory, especially in the first two decades of Gaddafi’s rule, which was part
of his declared policy to empower women and enforce their presence in public life in an effort to
promote himself as a women’s rights’ advocate.
As for holding a political position, women were present in different levels of the
government from lower to senior levels. The main requirement for men and women to win a
political position was the degree of loyalty to Gaddafi and the “active engagement in defending
and spreading the revolutionary ideology” (Issawi, 2014). However, an analysis of gender
representation in the legislative institution during the years 1969-2006 shows that of a total of 54
members, only six females were appointed during these years, which accounts for 11% of the
total members (Obeidi, 2008). The picture in the executive elite was worse than the legislative
one: of the 132 people who held different executive positions, only three were females; this
accounts for only 2% of the total during the same period of time (Obeidi, 2008, p. 121). This low
representation of women, which was limited to the areas of women’s affairs and social affairs,
contradicted with the official speech of the system, which “lauded the growing role of women in
all aspects of life” (Obeidi, 2008, p. 116).
Mobilizing Structure for Women During the Revolution
It is important to stress that the women’s movements and organizations that emerged
during the revolution in 2011 were part of a larger social movement in the form of a
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revolutionary act, which provided the opportunity for women’s movements to emerge. The social
uprisings that swept through Tunisia and Egypt in December 2010 and January 2011 and led to
overthrow two long-term dictatorships struck at the legitimacy of Gaddafi’s regime and
encouraged the people of Libya to take away their moral consent of the state’s authority. For
Libyans, who did not have previous experience in protesting and forming civil society initiatives,
the two revolutions served as “workshops from which the people in Libya absorbed the idea of
challenging the regime and embraced it” (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4,
2015). Moreover, the Libyan revolution proved that moral force is “an effective weapon when
challengers faced an opponent lacking legitimacy” (Oberschall, 1996, p. 94).
When the revolution broke in February 2011 and after the overthrow of Gaddafi, the
Libyans faced a great challenge of rebuilding their state institutions. Women were part of the
challenge. However, the challenge for women was not just against the regime and the hard task
of building new, reliable institutions. Women’s challenge was also against the deep-rooted
perception of women as passive citizens who are not part of the decision-making process and
whose participation in public life is limited. The challenge was to find a space for women in
which to build organizations that speak directly to women, to find ways within the system to
empower women and to get their voices heard.
Therefore, in the first few months after the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime, a considerable
number of women’s organizations emerged in Libya advocating women’s rights and helping
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women to improve their role in the society. Tamara C. Wittes2 emphasized that women’s
organizations in Libya were getting support from the international community “through the
United Nations Special Mission in Libya … we have already begun to offer our support to the
newly emerging NGOs in Libya and to support those who want to create new political parties to
compete in Libya’s planned elections. We will continue to focus on ensuring that Libyan women
are active beneficiaries of our efforts” (Wittes, 2011). Women took promising steps towards
securing their position as participants in the state- building process, as “Some of the most
promising and effective non-profit initiatives have been founded by women leaders” (Wittes,
2011). The mobilizing structure during the revolution could be divided into two main segments:
political institutions and civil society organizations. The role of women in these two segments
and the level of influence they had during the revolution will be examined in this section.
Revolutionary Political Institutions
The first political institution formed in the revolution was the National Transitional Council
(NTC), formed in February 2011 in Benghazi. The NTC, which was a unicameral legislative
body, started to receive international recognition shortly after its establishment. The initial
membership of the NTC included 33 members but not all member names were declared in the
beginning for security reasons. Of the names released, only one female member was identified:
Salwa El-Deghali, an academic who held a doctoral degree in constitutional law. El-Deghali was
in charge of women and legal affairs and was also the head of the NTC’s Legal Advisory

2

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and Deputy Special Coordinator for
Middle East Transitions Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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Committee (National Transitional Council, 2011).
When the names were first announced, El-Deghali replied to the skeptical voices regarding
the poor representation of women in the NTC by claiming that, while there was currently a total
of three female representatives in the NTC, more would be added in the future. She explained,
“This is just a transitional stage; once the regime falls, after that women will have a normal
representation” (Faul, 2011). However, when the names of the rest of the NTC members were
disclosed, the list included only one other female representative besides El-Deghali (her name
was Intisar Al-Aqeli) and no more female members were added to the list, which grew after the
collapse of the Gaddafi regime to include 150 members (National Transitional Council, 2012).
As noted above, El-Deghali was responsible for legal affairs and was the head of the TNC’s legal
advisory committee, which contributed in writing the interim constitutional declaration and other
legislative laws. However, some academics would argue that the committee did not pass any
laws or regulations to improve women rights, a fact El-Daghali admitted but who justified that
shortcoming in a TV interview, stating, “It is not necessary for the interim constitutional
declaration to include articles on women’s rights at this time. This will be taken care of when
drafting the constitution” (Obeidi, 2013, p. 19).
Women expressed their concern for women’s situation based on the poor representation of
women in the newly established government with only one woman out of the 15 members of the
executive office, and she was in charge of the portfolio of social affairs (Obeidi, 2013). In a
comment about women’s exclusion from the decision-making process, Amal Bugaighis, an
attorney and a cousin of Iman and Salwa, accused men of “trying to put the women back in the
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box” (Marlowe, 2011). Women’s rights activists showed their disapproval of the government’s
restraint from granting women a bigger role in decision-making positions; however, they “openly
admitted they had suppressed the alarm bells that rang when the NTC was formed, when out of
40 members, only two were women. Women decided that unity was more important than their
individual needs and that as soon as Libya was truly free (i.e., after Gaddafi's capture) then they
would speak out” (Omar, 2011).
Nevertheless, and despite the poor representation of women in the NTC and its executive
office, women stepped forward to hold different positions in the newly established revolutionary
government. Three of the women interviewed for this research study held positions in the NTC:
Iman Bugaighis, who was the spokesperson of the NTC; Hana El-Gallal, who was in charge of
the human rights profile, worked as administrator of education in the liberated cities, and was a
member of the media committee; and Najla Elmangoush, who was the head of the public
engagement unit.
Iman Bugaighis, a female orthodontist and one of the first women to join the revolution,
was chosen to be the spokesperson for the NTC and held several media conferences in which she
represented the NTC and the revolutionists’ points of view on the events. About the
circumstances of her appointment, Iman explained,
Nothing was planned for. It was a popular revolution and no one had overarching
authority. We, the people at the courthouse, obtained our authority from the event
itself. All members of the NTC found themselves on a particular historic moment
forced them to take initiatives. I am a multi-tasks person, I knew what to say and
when to say it, I speak English fluently and use a scientific approach to any issue;
I fit perfectly in the position. (Iman Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4,
2015)
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Iman and her sister Salwa were at the center of attention for Western media. Reports were
written about their contribution in the revolution in all sources of Western media, and her sister,
Salwa, was named the mother of the Libyan revolution (Giovani, 2014). However, Iman only
stayed in her position as a spokesperson for four months. She resigned in June 2011 when she
started to see changes in the message of the NTC and deviation from its original path:
At that time, I started to see a lot of disagreement points between me and the board. I saw
the chaos and the flops in the government, people who were in charge were ignorant and
did not have any proficiency, I could not justify many things, I felt like I am representing
something I don’t believe in anymore” (Iman Bugaighis, Personal interview, November
4, 2015).
Her decision was also a reaction to the increased level of unfair competition and the fight over
positions among the new elite. She claims that jealousy led people to attack her personally:
I was in the front; a lot of people did not like it. They started spreading rumors
about my intention with my sister to be the only Libyan faces in international
media. It all started when Western media wrote about my sister Salwa and me and
called us “the sisters of the revolution.” People did not like that attention and
started making up stories. They even accused me of locking the foreign journalists
up and forcing them to only interview my sister and I. I thought those false
accusations meant to destruct and degrade the revolution. At that point, I decided
to leave. The people in the government tried to make me change my mind by
offering me positions in the foreign ministry but my decision was final. (Iman
Bugaighis, Personal interview, November 4, 2015)
Iman decided to quit her political position and go back to being a college professor. She
disagreed with her sister Salwa, who viewed the situation differently and thought they should
continue their struggle till the end. Iman explained her decision:
I decided to help through my academic position. Salwa insisted that we should continue
our fight for a better Libya but politics at that time was like a tsunami. There was no
system and political appointments were based on verbal endorsements; a mistake that led
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the thieves and Gaddafi loyalists to find a place in the government. I told Salwa I will not
rule out politics altogether but I will do that within the system when there is one. (Iman
Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015)
Hana El-Gallal was present at the first meeting of the TNC and she was the only female to
appear in the first footage of the NTC. She was assigned the human rights file and worked as
administrator of education in the liberated cites on the east side of Libya, plus she was a member
of the media committee (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015). Just like
Iman, Hana resigned from all her official positions in May, 2011, only three months after the
revolution. She recalled,
I resigned … May 15, 2011 and went back to the streets to oppose my friends who were
with me in the beginning of the revolution even before the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime. I
did not join the revolution to secure an official position, I joined it in a hope to establish a
law and freedom state, to improve the people’s life in areas like health, education, and
infrastructure. (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015)
However, when Hana found out that not all the people who participated in the revolution shared
the same dreams as hers, she decided to leave. Hana explained her decision:
I refused to compromise my reputation by being part of this new system, which
started to repeat Gaddafi’s mistakes and allow for human rights violations and
corruption. Signs of reconciliation with the former regime were evident when
Gaddafi’s former minister became the head of the TNC and his internal minister
became the Army Chief of Staff for revolutionaries. Almost 90% of people who
held positions in the new government used to work with the former regime. There
were not any new faces; it was the same system. I was braver than others and
withdrew. (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15, 2015)
After resigning from her official positions, Hana started to do non-governmental
work and formed the Libyan Center for Development and Human Rights and continued
her work as a political and human rights activist.
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Najla Elmangoush was the head of the Public Engagement Unit during the period from
April to October 2011. She considered her job to be a link between the TNC and the public. She
referred to those days as the “best months in my life. We accomplished a lot with very little
experience and meager capabilities available to us” (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview,
December 5, 2015).
Najla was responsible for organizing and moderating weekly events in which members of
the TNC would meet with the public to answer their questions. The big success of those weekly
events created positive reactions to Najla’s idea, which was “meant to create confidence and trust
between the TNC and the public, and succeeded in that” (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview,
December 5, 2015).
Just like Iman and Hana, Najla left her position in October 2011, right after the collapse
of Gaddafi’s regime. Her motivations were also similar, as she started to observe negative signs
on the leadership level: “new names started to come out and hold political positions. In addition,
jealousy among women started to come to the surface” (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview,
December 5, 2015).
After the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, the TNC moved from Benghazi to Tripoli. Najla
was asked to move with them and continue her job as the head of the Public Engagement Unit,
but she refused because she felt that
Benghazi deserves better. Benghazi deserved to have its prestige as a second city in
Libya. I started my job in Benghazi and I had a wonderful group working with me; we all
had no experience in organizing and running public events. That’s why our success was
historic, in my opinion; I could not just leave. I offered my help to establish a similar unit
in Tripoli to continue the work. I even offered to moderate the first session but I could not
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leave Benghazi where I work and live. (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview, December
5, 2015)
Civil Society Organizations and Non-Governmental Contributions
Women’s involvement in the public sphere was not limited to formal political institutions.
In fact, the contribution of women in civil society and non-governmental work exceeded all
expectations. Within one year of the revolution, more than 2000 civil society organizations were
established in Libya to promote women’s rights and protect the new advanced roles women
gained during the revolution (the Election Assessment Team of the European Union, 2012).
Naturally, most of those organizations were established in Benghazi and the eastern region of
Cyrenaica because it was liberated from Gaddafi early in the revolution. At that time, women
were strongly present in crisis-related activities and associations, which were created during the
war (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview, December 5, 2015), such as the disaster and aid
committee, the association to search for missing people during the liberation war, and civil
society groups to work with refugees and document their cases. However, many of those
organizations opened regional offices in the west—especially the capital, Tripoli—right before
or soon after the collapse of the former regime (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November
13, 2015).
One of the first organizations founded during the revolution was the Committee to Support
Women’s Participation in Decision Making. The committee was established in Benghazi in July
2011 with the main purposes of empowering women and supporting women’s involvement in
gender equality, political decision-making, and constitutionalizing women’s rights (Nadine
Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015). Nadine Nasrat headed the committee’s main
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branch in Tripoli, which was established in September 2011. She explained the circumstances of
the organization’s establishment:
I have a personal relationship with Naima Jebril, the founder of the Committee to Support
Women’s Participation in Decision Making. I met with her in her house during the first
few months of the revolution and she told me about her idea of creating an organization
to support women’s rights. I was excited and started to read about civil society
organizations and their mechanism since I had absolutely no experience in that field.
(Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015).
Despite her lack of experience and her hesitation in entering a new domain of social work,
Nadine agreed to establish a branch of the organization in Tripoli, where she lives. Unlike most
of the civil society organizations founded during and after the revolution, the Committee to
Support Women’s Participation in Decision Making had a strictly political agenda. The main
concern was to advocate for women’s political rights and help them “be part of the decisionmaking process and be aware of their political rights. In our society, women are heavily
presented at the grassroots and middle level, not the high level; it was our job to prepare women
for the new political environment” (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015).
However, people in power did not always welcome the committee’s activities. The
women in the organization faced multiple challenges in their campaign. Nadine related,
We used to go the hospitals and give lectures to the nurses on their rights. We tried to do
the same with the teachers in public schools but the minister of education at that time
refused to give us permission to do so; he was against us, against our mission altogether
and it took us a long time to reach a settlement with the ministry and get permission to
work in certain geographic locations.
Between Enthusiasm and Lack of Experience
Even though women during the revolution were the leading force to establish and
participate in civil society movements, entering this new domain from which Libya had been
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alienated for more than four decades was not an easy task for women. Women’s civic work,
especially during the first few months of the revolution, ran into various challenges that included
“lack of administrative and hierarchal structures, absence of experience in administrative skills,
and scarcity of funding” (Obeidi, 2013, p. 28).
The women interviewed for this study admitted the weaknesses in the performance of
women’s organizations, especially during the first year following the revolution. Nadine Nasrat
acknowledged that lack of previous experience affected the launch of civil society activities. She
admitted that at the beginning of the revolution, activists did not know the differences between
civil society and charity work:
We would confuse the two. We also did not recognize the boundaries between civil
society and the government and how the civil society should work as a monitor for the
government and separate from it. Because of that confusion, some civil society activists
ended up holding positions in the government. (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview,
November 13, 2015)
The internal structure and working mechanism was also a problem for those newborn
organizations, as most of them did not have an organizational concept in terms of decisionmaking and objective planning. Instead, those organizations were run
by only one or two people who monopolized decision making and participated in every
gathering place or concourse without giving a chance to others. Unfortunately, some of
them sought their own interests not the nation’s; they wanted to be at the center of
attention all the time, especially when dealing with international organizations. (Nadine
Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015)
The absence of concepts like teamwork and professionalism, a deficiency that was
inherited from Gaddafi’s long-lasting tyrant regime, was reflected in the behavior of some
women in civil society organizations who were “stealing the work and effort of others and
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presenting it as theirs; fighting over who would give a speech or being recognized in a workshop.
Those individual actions affected our work to a great extent. I always tell them we don’t have to
love each other; we only need to respect each other” (Nadine Nasrat, personal interview,
November 13, 2015).
Hana El-Gallal, who worked as independent activist with different organizations
(including women’s organizations) during the revolution, reflected on her experience with those
organizations.
There are all types of organizations working in Libya since the revolution. On the one
hand, there were some strong organizations with a clear message which managed to make
a difference on the ground, working on issues like women, children, and elections and
seeking to build capacities and raise awareness. On the other hand, there were some
delusive organizations which did not really exist on the ground and only aimed to get
funds from the international society. (Hana El-Gallal, personal interview, November 15,
2015).
Some women and organizations recognized some aspects of insufficiency in the newly
established civil society in Libya and took initiatives to improve women’s performance by taking
advantage of the long experience in women’s organizations in neighboring countries like Egypt.
Starting in July 2011, Zahra’ Langhi, who lived most of her life in Egypt, organized several civil
society workshops in Egypt for Libyan youth with a special focus on women’s participation. By
training the youth and helping them learn from the civil society practices in Tunisia and Egypt,
Langhi aimed to “build a civil society capacity in Libya” (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview,
December 14, 2015).
The Role of International Society in Building Civil Society Capacities
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The international society recognized the new Libyan civil society’s urgent need for help.
This recognition was reflected in various workshops and training meetings organized and run by
international organizations like the EU and the UN, especially through the UNDP program
(UNDP in Libya, 2014). Those programs were intended to support projects to improve women’s
political and economic situations.
However, the international help was ignorant to the particularity of the Libyan case with
regard to the absence of experience. Nadine Nasrat explained the first encounter of her
organization with an international society:
They came to us assuming that we know how to write a proposal and how to
specify our goals and link them to a budget; we don’t do this in Libya! We have
never done such work before. They would always undermine our effort and say it
is below standards. I remember we presented a proposal in a meeting with the EU
and several European ambassadors. They scolded us by saying, “This is not a
proposal; this is rubbish.” I was so upset and told them this not time for
evaluation; you can evaluate us after ten years, not now. You should have focused
on building capacity first by teaching us how things work instead of criticizing us.
(Nadine Nasrat, personal interview, November 13, 2015)
Another aspect of the international society’s mishandling the case of civil society in
Libya, according to Nadine, was to
fund diaspora Libyan women in America and England to come to Libya for few days,
organize and run workshops for women and when they leave the country they appear in
international news to give a very grim picture about women in Libya. They undermine
their work and depict them as ignorant and present themselves as the saviors and heroes.
We suffered a lot from this type of women; they are pathetic. (Nadine Nasrat, personal
interview, November 13, 2015)
In summary, the revolutionary structure, with all its instability and crisis-related
priorities, did not hinder women from seeking a firm foothold in the political and civil map of
new Libya. Even though women had a shy formal political presentation in the transitional state
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institutions, they managed to find a place in different levels of the political structure, relying only
on their skills and qualifications which made women’s involvement inevitable.
Moreover, women found their place in the civil work. The big wave of women’s civil
society organizations which had various interests, from women’s rights to human rights to
children and refugees, provided women with a larger space in which to engage and make
changes on the ground despite the difficulties and regardless of their lack of experience.
Mobilizing Structure After the Revolution
Despite the potential social and security challenges and the long history of poor
representation of women at the high levels of governance and their low access to their political,
economic, and social rights, women started their campaign early after liberation to secure decent
representation in the new elected bodies in the political system. The elections were held on
different levels of the political system. However, the data for the local and municipal elections is
not available for all cities in Libya. In general, women’s presence in the municipal level was very
humble. In Benghazi, for example, of 18 women who ran for seats on the local council, only one
woman won, while women did not win any seats in other cities like Misrata (Obeidi, 2013).
However, this research study focuses on the political participation of women at the national
level. The country witnessed three general elections for three political bodies, the General
National Congress (GNC), the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), and the House of
Representatives (HoR).
Libyan women entered the new phase of a Gaddafi-free Libya with a short experience of
political involvement in state institutions and a leading role in the newly born civil society
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organizations. Regardless of their brief experience in activism and mobilizing work, women used
their new-learned tools to seek a sustainable political role and secure decent representation in the
government branches.
However, concerns have been raised about securing sustainable public activities and a
continued political participation for women after the revolution, considering the dynamics of the
election process such as the “desire to have area representation from different parts of Libya, and
particularly tribal representation, some of which harbor biases against the political participation
of women. Libyan women are hesitant to become part of the political process without a
guaranteed safe and enabling environment” (Omar, 2011).
Women in the Legislative Branch
In December 2011, two months after the liberation address, and after the Draft
Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage was declared by the NTC, women were given a
10% quota in the General National Congress (GNC) elections (Gender Concerns International ,
2012). A huge campaign led by women’s civil society groups was launched to demand decent
representation for women in the upcoming legislative body. The campaign demanded a 40%
quota in the upcoming elections for the GNC. However, some activists thought that those
demands did not have a logical platform. Zahra’ Langhi worked closely with the electoral law
committee and her organization Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace (2014) was monitoring the
law-writing process. Langhi stressed that women’s movements who called for those demands
(quota) were pushed by the international community and the UN to demand a quota for women
and a percentage in the parliament without any preparation for the society to accept those

128
demands:
Women made a mistake when they worked for political change without social
mobilization. People in Libya did not accept those demands, why 40% and not
50% or 60%? The word “quota” in itself is a foreign word. A lot of people
considered it part of a foreign agenda that seeks to destroy our social norms; even
women were against it for that reason. When they translated the term they called
it (the positive discrimination) Altamieez Aliejabey. People objected to the term
and considered it against the concept of equal citizenship. In the end, the demands
were rejected. (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015)
When women’s movements’ efforts to pass the quota law did not succeed, Zahra’ and
other activists sought a different approach to secure decent representation for women in the
GNC. “People accused me of giving up on the quota fight; that’s not true. I rearranged my
priorities. We cannot seek a change in one area and ignore the others. My goal is not just about
empowering women anymore; it is about institutional reforms, inclusive democracy, and gender
equality” (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015).
Zahra’ started using her newly learned lobbying skills and the experience she gained from
attending regional meetings with Tunisian activists. She contacted Salah Merghani, then Minister
of Justice, and suggested using a “zipper list” in the upcoming elections. The minister liked the
suggested revisions and drafted a law with vertical and horizontal lists so the names of men and
women would alternately appear at the top of the lists (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview,
December 14, 2015). After days of negotiations and debates with the committee, the NTC
approved the revisions to the draft to add zippered candidate lists for political party seats in
which both genders’ names appear alternately on the list. This revision increased women’s
chances to win seats in the constitutional assembly from 0% to 20-40% (LWPP, 2014).
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As a result of using the zipper list in the GNC elections (the first elected parliament since
the fall of Gaddafi’s regime), out of 200 members in the General National Congress, 33 women
were elected; that is 16.5% of the total elected members (LWPP, 2014). Out of those 33 female
members, 32 won as a result of the zipper list. In contrast, 85 women ran as individual candidates
but only one woman won through that system (The Carter Center, 2014). The results in the
individual system indicate that the voters, men and women alike, prefer to give their vote to a
male representative and not a female one (The Carter Center, 2014). Zahra’ Langhi explained
that
the zipper list was a success. Women do much better in the list system than they do in the
individual system, as it gives a chance for women and other minorities to win. I
supported the zipper list even though the Liberals were worried that the list system would
give the Islamists bigger chances to win more seats. The Liberals even offered me
personally a seat in exchange for giving up on the zipper list campaign, but I rejected
their offer. (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015)
Despite the efforts to secure a place for women in the decision-making process, and
regardless of women’s noticeable success in the first elections in Libya in 42 years, indications
of societal rejection for women in the public sphere are visible in the dynamics and results of the
general elections. During the General National Congress elections in 2012 and the Constitutional
Drafting Assembly in 2014, women’s campaigns were more likely to be targeted and female
candidates faced more security challenges than their male counterparts (The Carter Center,
2014).
Moreover, the success in reserving 16.5% of the GNC seats for women was followed
with a much lower percentage of women’s representation in the elected body of the
Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA). The Assembly consists of 60 members: 20 from each
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region, who were elected by popular vote. Women were assigned six seats, or 10% of the total
seats in the CDA (Electoral Law 17, Article 6, Section 2, 2013). This poor representation of
women in the CDA led to limiting women’s presence in the subcommittees of the constitutional
assembly to three subcommittees out of eight (Constitutional Drafting Assembly, 2014).
The CDA election campaign started in December 2013 while the country was subject to
insecurity due to the ongoing armed conflict among militias in different parts of Libya,
especially in the east and south. Local civil society organizations reported minor campaign
violations and incidents where candidates could not campaign because of the armed conflicts in
the south or because of intimidation strategies in the east (The Carter Center, 2014). In the city of
Derna, for example, candidates were not able to run their campaigns because militias openly
targeted them. Civil society reports indicate that on Election Day, five polling centers were
bombed in that city (The Carter Center, 2014). Therefore, the lack of security and the absence of
the rule of law, along with the large-scale armed conflict, were direct reasons many candidates
did not get a fair chance in the elections. These problems also contributed to lower numbers of
voter turnout than in the previous GNC elections. In addition, the relatively short period between
the beginning of the election campaign (December 25, 2015) and the actual election day
(February 20, 2016) did not give the candidates enough time to communicate with their voters on
main constitutional issues (The Carter Center, 2014).
In addition to the general factors that affected the chances of all candidates, women
candidates faced more challenges running their campaigns in the CDA, as they were subject to
“relentless campaigns against women with experience and competence in the legal and political
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fields and other areas on the pretext that they were liberals and non-veiled women. Perhaps those
were attempts to persuade the public not to vote for them in the event of their participation in the
CDA elections” (Obeidi, 2013, p. 21).
The third general elections were to elect the House of Representatives, and took place in
July 2014. Women’s movements aimed to secure a better level of representation in the new
legislative body. Therefore, women’s rights activists campaigned for the inclusion of the same
percentage of women’s representation as the one obtained in the GNC elections.
The GNC formed a commission named the February Commission, whose task was to
submit a proposal to modify the constitutional declaration. The Commission consisted of 15
members, nine of whom were independents and six of whom were GNC members. Only one
woman was on the Commission: the lawyer Azza Maghur. Azza recalls being the most organized
and the most energetic member on the Commission:
I arrived to the first meeting prepared, I had the statute and general principles of the
Commission ready. I insisted that the Commission would not take money from the GNC,
to guarantee its independency. We finished our tasks in two weeks, I would stay late at
night after all members left and write a daily report on our work and publish it to prove
our transparency. (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016)
Azza took advantage of her membership on the February Commission to push for
constitutionalizing the 16% quota for women. She insisted that women receive fair
representation in the HoR: “It was not an easy task; the Islamist members in the Commission
objected to my request to hold the 16% as a minimum percentage of women in the House of
Representatives. I wanted to prevent what happened in the CDA when women’s representation
dropped significantly. I believe that quota is important at this stage” (Azza Maghur, personal
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interview, May 11, 2016). The 16% quota for women was adopted in the new electoral law
(Electoral Law 10, Article 18, 2014), and women were assigned 32 seats in the HoR.
However, the intensity of armed conflicts and the new registration regulations resulted in
a very low turnout, as only 14% of Libyans voted in the HoR elections (Temuhu, n.d.), which is
about half of the registered voters in the GNC elections.
Women in the Executive Branch
Women’s success in guaranteeing a 16% quota in the two legislative bodies elected after
the revolution was not reflected in the executive branch. The first government formed after the
liberation was led by Abdulraheem Alkeeb and included 26 ministers. Only two of them were
women, and they were assigned to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Services.
Six other women were appointed as deputies of other ministries (Obeidi, 2013). The same pattern
was repeated in the next formed government led by Ali Zaidan, who appointed two female
ministers out of 29; again, they were assigned to social services and tourism (Obeidi, 2013).
After Zaidan’s government, and due to the deterioration of the security situation and the
proliferation of militias, the country was divided politically into two state governments, one in
the East under the authority of the House of Representatives and the other in the West following
the General National Conference. The political instability following the fall of Gaddafi’s regime
resulted in the creation of 10 short-lived governments in the East and West in six years, some of
which did not last for more than a month (Sky News, 2016). Therefore, even though most of
those governments included at least one woman in their ministerial lineup, the presence of
women in those governments was not significant due to their short life span.
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Nevertheless, some activists find the poor representation of women in the executive branch
alarming based on the idea that “if woman could not be in the executive branch, she will not be
able to accomplish a lot and she will lose the gains she obtained since the revolution” (Azza
Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016).
Women’s Behavior as Voters
Women’s participation in the three general elections that took place in Libya after the
revolution was significant. Their participation in the GNC elections in 2012 reached 45%. The
percentage dropped in the CDA elections in February 2014 to 41% and declined again in the
HoR elections in June 2014 to 40%. Regardless of the slight decline in the women’s voting
percentages, these numbers indicate that women are aware of their weight in the elections and
are fighting to maintain an active role in the political arena. The HNEC reports that in some
constituencies, women scored higher participating numbers than men; this made women’s vote
the factor that “decides the winner of the seat at those constituencies” (HNEC, 2014).
However, the high turnout of women in the elections as registered voters was not
translated automatically into higher female winners in the elections. In fact, according to a
survey conducted by Danish Church Aid in 2014, both men and women in Libya support the idea
of having female candidates running for political positions but only a few said that they would
actually vote for a woman to represent them (The Carter Center, 2014). The High National
Elections Commission supports these findings in its report on Libya’s general elections, which
states that “after comparing the percentages of women participation in election processes with
seats won by women, it becomes clear that women usually go for male candidates” (HNEC,
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2014). The women’s tendency to vote for male representatives could have cultural roots from
which most women still believe that it is more desirable for men to hold political positions and to
become public figures than women.
Challenges for Women in the Political System
Women candidates and women voters encountered more challenges as other social and
systemic factors made women’s participation in this election much lower than in the previous
GNC elections. According to the Carter Report (The Carter Center, 2014), female candidates
faced more challenges running their campaigns than their male counterparts. Those challenges
included women’s lack of access to financial resources in comparison to their male counterparts,
the vulnerability of women when campaigning in absence of security, the targeting of female
candidates by defacing their campaign posters, and lastly, the fact that women do poorly when
running for open seats (The Carter Center, 2014). As a result, out of 649 candidates for the CDA,
only 64 were women and only six were elected; this outcome led to a severe underrepresentation of women in the constitutional drafting process (The Carter Center, 2014).
Women voters faced their own share of obstacles that prevented a large number of female
voters from casting their vote. Most of those obstacles resulted from the changes made by the
High National Election Commission to the voting requirements, especially with regard to the
voter registration system. Based on the new registration rules, voters should register to vote
electronically by sending an SMS from their mobile phones. They also needed their national
identification number to register. Reports showed that because fewer women possess mobile
phones than men, it was more difficult for women to register to vote. Also, the family book is
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normally in the possession of the head of the family figure such as the father or the husband, and
this limits women’s access to the information needed to register. In addition, women who are
married to non-Libyan husbands (approximately 5500 citizens) did not have an identification
number and even when this problem was solved, they were given ID numbers with a format
different than the standard format, which was not accepted in the digital voting system. As a
result, those women were disinclined to vote (The Carter Center, 2014).
In summary, despite their brief experience, women’s movements in Libya showed that
they could be real players in the political system. Their ability in making changes became visible
in the legislative elections. Women’s movements acted collectively to secure decent
representation for women in both the GNC and the HoR elections. Moreover, individual female
actors took advantage of their positions in the political system to promote women’s rights. The
results were a 16% quota for women in both legislative bodies. However, the CDA elections
showed that the absence of women’s movements’ pressure would reduce women’s chances of
winning seats in the elections.
On the other hand, women as voters proved that they are aware of their political rights, as
their participation levels in the general elections show. However, those votes are not necessarily
going for female candidates.

The interviewees for this study expressed different opinions regarding the performance of
female representatives in the legislative bodies and in the executive office. On the one hand,
some interviewees like Nadine Nasrat and Shahrazad Kablan viewed women’s performance
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positively, especially the achievements of some female individuals like the appointed
ambassadors to the U.S. and the EU and some members in the GNA and HoR.
On the other hand, other interviewees like Najla Elmangoush saw the performance of
most female representatives in the political system as poor and disappointing. She believed that
the
selfish performance of our female political representatives and their lack of
experience and low capacity provided bad outcome. [That’s] the thing which will
affect women’s future chances of getting elected again or to be in any future
ministerial lineup. I blame the international society, who pushed for women to
hold political positions with no regard to their deprived qualifications. (Najla
Elmangoush, personal interview, December 5, 2015)
However, the interviewees agreed that the performance of women holding political
positions should be reviewed as part of the whole political system, which is characterized by lack
of experience and high levels of corruption. They also agreed that females’ lack of experience is
more likely to be emphasized in the media than that of their male counterparts.
Conclusion
The political structure of Libya under Gaddafi did not provide much space for women to
be present. Due to political and social factors, women did not push to have a role in the political
system under Gaddafi. However, during the revolution, women started to form a new substantial
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role for themselves in the political system, especially through informal institutions, which took
off largely in the form of civil society organizations and women’s rights movements.
The focus on informal institutions was associated with the fact that women did not have a
strong presence in the formal political institutions in general and in the executive branch in
particular. Other than a handful of women who proved themselves as actual partners in the
political structure, the representation of women in formal institutions does not rise to the high
expectations women had for themselves during the revolution. However, women revealed high
levels of awareness of their capabilities as voters to make change. This awareness shows that
women understand the importance of their weight in the election process, and if women’s
movements become more organized they can push for more women’s rights to be recognized in
the future.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The revolution in Libya opened the door for women to undertake new roles in public
space; at the same time, women were the real power behind the start of the revolution and were
an essential component in it. Politics and civil society are new domains for women in Libya, and
Libyan women had no experience up until the revolution in 2011 in how to organize a protest or
when to push for a particular regulation; they did not even know how to write a proposal to
request funds from international organizations.
The women interviewed for this research study recognized the change the revolution
triggered on both aggregated and personal levels. As one interviewee stated,
In the revolution, we experienced new emotions we never felt before. We
discovered how much we love our country. My daughter was raised in England;
since we got home a year before the revolution, she was always criticizing
everything about Libya and considered herself a British. During the revolution, she
was with me everywhere, in the protests, in the meetings, she saw the
revolutionaries hiding weapons in our home. One day she told me, “Mom, I am
proud to be Libyan…I want to study hard so I can help in building Libya and make
it like England.” Her words were my biggest personal victory. The revolution gave
her the most valuable lesson in patriotism and how to make a difference. (Iman
Bugaighis, personal interview, November 4, 2015)
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Female activists admitted that they rediscovered their own capabilities during the
revolution; as Zahra’ Langhi explained,
The revolution empowered me, it changed me socially and intellectually, I am not
the same person I was before. I never traveled without my husband before, now I
travel alone a lot to attend conferences and meetings. It was not an easy change.
It’s not just me, a lot of women went through the same experience. I call it
irreversible empowerment on both existential and social levels. (Zahra’ Langhi,
Personal interview, December 14, 2015)
Five years after the revolution, women have created their own space in society. They took
initiatives in civil society work in general and women empowerment projects in particular. Even
though they made fewer achievements with regard to decision-making positions, women are
present in the legislative branch and in some other local political positions.
Yet, those achievements are far from being considered sustainable gains for women.
Different factors are pulling women back to their old place in society. Those factors include the
predominant culture, which, apparently, needs more than sudden political and social
transformations to change. Soon after the revolution ended,
women were told to go back home and men held all positions. Women, by nature,
are the incubator element of the state and without a real representation for women
the state will not advance. The elections brought weak women to the legislative
seats so they can be manipulated. We are a patriarchal society and women are
always the easiest target; the attack on them will also hurt their families.
(Shahrazad Kablan, personal interview, March 6, 2015)
Another factor that contributes to the decline in women’s participation is the rise of
fundamental Islamism, which takes a reactionary approach to women’s public engagement.
Fundamental groups are one of the main concerns for female activists. Self-proclaimed religious
political groups are getting involved in different areas in the society.
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They are fighting us. Whenever we arrange for a protest to demand certain rights
for women, they would go out on the same day and even use women to go against
us and claim that our demands are against the religion. They got involved in the
education system and called for separating the girls from boys in public schools.
They even got involved in writing the curriculum for elementary and secondary
education levels in which they presented women only as housewives with an
ultimate ambition of cleaning the house and cooking dinner. (Nadine Nasrat,
personal interview, November 13, 2015)
Moreover, activists see that the threat of extreme ideologies is not limited to the political
and social aspects; it reaches its maximum levels when ideology differences take the form of
armed conflict: “Arms are the main issue, you can not discuss anything with someone with a
weapon in his hand. Women don’t carry weapons; we talk, and we negotiate. As long as those
guys have weapons, we can’t talk. If those groups came to power, it is the end of women’s
activism” (Azza Maghur, personal interview, May 11, 2016).
Naturally, political instability and armed conflict are connected to the issue of security.
The lack of security became the primary concern for the society. As a result, women’s activism
had a setback due to the lack of security: “Security is the key word, it is the only guarantee for
women to continue their participation in public space” (Najla Elmangoush, personal interview,
December 5, 2015).
Consequently, the current situation of women’s activism is set back to the individual
initiatives stage. Women now are not acting collectively to seize political opportunities. Instead,
female activists and politicians are acting either as independent agents or through their own
limited-resourced organizations in exile to improve women’s chances to be part of the statebuilding process. Specifically, some activists focus their efforts on conflict resolution strategies
as their means of action.
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Even though women’s engagement in the public sphere politically and socially which
reached its peak during the revolution started to decline for the reasons mentioned above, the
interviewees for this research all had big hopes for a larger role for women in the future. Almost
all of them expressed their willingness to personally play a role in the future either in politics or
in civil society initiatives. They considered the stage women are going through as a selfimprovement stage and learning phase. They believe that women can play a role in the conflict
resolution efforts and state-building process. “There is no magic spell to bring security and
peace. Women should have their agenda to create peace and get to the roots of the problems.
However, working within the same old paradigm and masculine mindset means that we are not
moving forward. The real challenge is to build feminine discourse that is centered around
feminist values” (Zahra’ Langhi, personal interview, December 14, 2015).
Efforts towards creating this new discourse started to take place amid the current critical
times the country is going through. Even though most female activists who played a role in the
political and social arenas had to flee the country and slow down their activities, a new wave of
women’s activism started to take place. Projects led by youth and aiming to empower women are
using the tools of social media to get their voices heard. An example is Project Silphium, an
initiative created by a group of six activists (four females and two males) who work to change
the traditional image of women in Libyan society through introducing a new feminist discourse
(Project Silphium, 2015a). The project presents women’s perspectives on various issues through
short articles written by women. It also tells stories of successful women who managed to make
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a difference in Libyan society through their social, political, or economic contribution (Project
Silphium, 2015b).
Project Silphium was launched in 2015. The people who run the project keep their
identities covert because they work from Libya. The group, which includes bloggers from
Benghazi and Tripoli, did not want to take the risk of disclosing their real names in their blog
and exposing themselves to threats. The new wave of young female activists working from
inside Libya are trying to protect themselves while at the same time contributing in creating a
new perception of women in Libyan society. One blogger in the group introduces herself by
stating that she is a “Stubborn Libyan that won’t accept the status quo. Exposed to the real
struggles of working in a male-dominated environment. I try and change what I can in my spare
time” (Project Silphium, 2015b).
Another member in the team describes herself to the readers as
Tamazight, feminist, activist and an eager soul for social justice. I love learning and
experiencing. Learning about new languages, ideas and cultures, and experiencing
adventures, complexities of thoughts and friendships. I take my strengths through
activism and women’s stories of Libya which inspires my life. (Project Silphium, 2015b)
The team members of Project Silphium work with awareness of their surroundings: the
ongoing war, the rising fundamentalism, and the deepened political divisions. Their articles
reflect strong feminist opinions on what is going on in Libya and offer possible solutions to the
problems the country is facing.
Project Silphium reflects the current situation of women’s activism in Libya, which is
also a reflection of the whole picture of Libya. Women are working from within. Their tools
might have been changed from direct activism on the ground to those which rely on social media
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as their means of action. Women are trying to get their message across even if they do that from
behind the keyboards and by using nicknames.
Finally, even though women’s participation in political and social arenas in Libya is a
new practice, women’s activism went beyond expectations in such a short time despite the
current challenges women are facing. The changes in women’s political and social situations
which were associated with the Libyan revolution in 2011 could have long-lasting effects on
Libyan women and the way they perceive their role in the future Libya.
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEWEES’ PROFILES
Iman Bugaighis: is an orthodontist and one of the first women to join the revolution with
her sister, Salwa. Iman and her sister were among the first handful of people who protested in the
courthouse in Benghazi in February 2011. She was chosen to be the spokesperson for the
National Transitional Council (NTC), the first political body created in the beginning of the
revolution to speak for the opposition. During that time, Iman held several media conferences in
which she represented the NTC and the revolutionists’ points of view on the events. She resigned
from her position after a few months and decided to go back to her original work as a university
professor. Her sister Salwa continued her active political work and served on the peace-building
committee; she was assassinated in her own home in Benghazi on June 25, 2014 on the day of
national elections. Iman fled the country following that tragedy and she lives in exile with her
husband and daughter.
Hana El-Gallal: is an international law professor at Benghazi University. She joined the
uprising on February 17, 2011 and was the only woman present at the first official meeting of the
National Transnational Council. Hana was in charge of the human rights profile on the Council,
served as administrator of education in the liberated cities during the revolution, and was a
member of the media committee at the same time. She resigned from all her positions in May
2011 and decided to go back on the streets to oppose the new leadership. She established the
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Libyan Center for Development and Human Rights and has worked as an independent activist
since then. She refused all political positions she was offered from the consecutive governments.
Hana fled the country with her two sons after she received death threats from unidentified
parties. Hana is still active through social media and has dedicated her time to raise political and
legal awareness about the situation in Libya. She also has an active academic profile through
presenting her research at international conferences.
Najla Elmangoush: is a lawyer and law professor. She worked in different positions in
the NTC during the revolution including the media committee, relief committee, and
communication with international media. She held the position of the head of the public
engagement unit in the NTC. After the liberation, Najla worked as a field officer for the U.S.
Institute of Peace in Libya. She was granted a Fulbright scholarship, through which she received
her M.A. in Conflict Transformation. Currently, Najla is a Ph.D. student at the School for
Conflict Analysis and Resolution in the U.S.
Jameela Hwaiow: is a board member in the Sanabel El-Hedaya Organization, one of a
handful of self-funded organizations founded during the Gaddafi era that continued its activities
during and after the revolution. The organization’s activities are strictly social service-based with
no political agenda and rely on charity and community contributions.
Shahrazad Kablan: is a Libyan-American who works as a teacher in an American
middle school. Her political engagement in the revolution started when she lobbied for the
implementation of the No Fly Zone and the international military intervention in Libya and
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pushed for the UN to protect civilians in Libya after the brutal power used by Gaddafi to repress
the revolution. However, her major contribution in the revolution was when she became the first
female anchor in the first oppositional TV station created during the revolution, which was
broadcasting from Qatar. Shahrazad maintained a strategy of sending community-unifying
messages through her broadly well-received TV show and worked on emphasizing the common
national sense among Libyans and sent positive messages to the revolutionary forces to continue
their fight against Gaddafi. She stopped her program right after the liberation and has worked as
an independent activist since then. She served as the Libyan National Advisor for the Libyan
Out-of-Country voting in the U.S. during the general elections in 2012. She continues her
political involvement with a special focus on improving the educational system in Libya.
Azza Maghur: is a Libyan lawyer and human rights activist. She is well known in Libya
for her history of defending political prisoners and calling for a constitution during the Gaddafi
regime. During and after the revolution, Azza campaigned for democracy, human rights, and
women rights. She focused on calling for changing the unjust laws towards women, especially
with regard to their social and divorce rights. She was the head of a legal committee to draft laws
concerning NGOs. She also worked on broadening legislation, including the election law of
2012. Azza was the only female member in the February Constitutional Committee that was in
charge of amending the Libyan Constitutional Declaration. The amendment led to the creation of
the Libyan House of Representatives. Azza fled Tripoli after receiving death threats for her
active role during and after the revolution; she lives in exile with her family.
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Zahra’ Langhi: is a women’s rights activist. Her engagement in the revolution began
early when she started advocating for the uprising from Egypt, where she had lived her entire life
with her family, which had a rich history of opposing Gaddafi. She worked on mobilizing the
international community in support of the uprising and contacted international media outlets with
updates on the ongoing events. Zahra’ is the co-founder of the Libyan Women Platform for
Peace, one of the largest women’s organizations founded after the revolution. The LWPP is a
movement advocating for inclusive democracy and peace building. The organization takes a
gender-sensitive approach to address women’s issues rather than a gender-equality approach.
Nadine Nasrat: is an advocate for women’s political rights. She joined the revolution
from Tripoli, where she lived. Her engagement took a specific direction from the beginning, as
she got involved in non-governmental work to build women’s political capacity, raise women’s
awareness of their political rights, and mobilize for women’s equal participation in the political
decision-making process. She is a co-founder of the Committee to Support Women’s
Participation in Decision Making and the spearhead of the organization’s branch in Tripoli.
Nadine participated in several national and international initiatives to promote women’s political
rights in the post-Gaddafi Libya. Nadine left the country with her family after receiving several
death threats from unidentified parties.

